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Abstract
Mobile advertising is emerging as a promising advertising strategy, which leverages pre-
scriptive analytics, location-based distribution, and feedback-driven marketing to engage
consumers with timely and targeted advertisements. In the current mobile advertising
system, a third-party ad broker collects and manages advertisements for merchants who
would like to promote their business to mobile users. Based on its large-scale database of
user profiles, the ad broker can help the merchants to better reach out to customers with
related interests and charges the merchants for ad dissemination services. Recently, mobile
advertising technology has dominated the digital advertising industry and has become the
main source of income for IT giants. However, there are many security and privacy chal-
lenges that may hinder the continuous success of the mobile advertising industry. First,
there is a lack of advertising transparency in the current mobile advertising system. For
example, mobile users are concerned about the reliability and trustworthiness of the ad
dissemination process and advertising review system. Without proper countermeasures,
mobile users can install ad-blocking software to filter out irrelevant or even misleading
advertisements, which may lower the advertising investments from merchants. Second, as
more strict privacy regulations (e.g. European General Data Privacy Regulations) take ef-
fect, it is critical to protect mobile users’ personal profiles from illegal sharing and exposure
in the mobile advertising system.
In this thesis, three security and privacy challenges for the mobile advertising sys-
tem are identified and addressed with the designs, implementations, and evaluations of a
blockchain-based architecture. First, we study the anonymous review system for the mo-
bile advertising industry. When receiving advertisements from a specific merchant (e.g. a
nearby restaurant), mobile users are more likely to browse the previous reviews about the
merchant for quality-of-service assessments. However, current review systems are known
for the lack of system transparency and are subject to many attacks, such as double reviews
and deletions of negative reviews. We exploit the tamper-proof nature and the distributed
consensus mechanism of the blockchain technology, to design a blockchain-based review
system for mobile advertising, where review accumulations are transparent and verifiable
to the public. To preserve user review privacy, we further design an anonymous review
token generation scheme, where users are encouraged to leave reviews anonymously while
still ensuring the review authenticity. We also explore the implementation challenges of
the blockchain-based system on an Ethereum testing network and the experimental results
demonstrate the application feasibility of the proposed anonymous review system. Second,
we investigate the transparency issues for the targeted ad dissemination process. Specif-
ically, we focus on a specific mobile advertising application: vehicular local advertising,
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where vehicular users send spatial-keyword queries to ad brokers to receive location-aware
advertisements. To build a transparent advertising system, the ad brokers are required
to provide mobile users with explanations on the ad dissemination process, e.g., why a
specific ad is disseminated to a mobile user. However, such transparency explanations are
often found incomplete and sometimes even misleading, which may lower the user trust
on the advertising system if without proper countermeasures. Therefore, we design an
advertising smart contract to efficiently realize a publicly verifiable spatial-keyword query
scheme. Instead of directly implementing the spatial-keyword query scheme on the smart
contract with prohibitive storage and computation cost, we exploit the on/off-chain com-
putation models to trade the expensive on-chain cost for cheap off-chain cost. With two
design strategies: digest-and-verify and divide-then-assemble, the on-chain cost for a single
spatial keyword query is reduced to constant regardless of the scale of the spatial-keyword
database. Extensive experiments are conducted to provide both on-chain and off-chain
benchmarks with a verifiable computation framework. Third, we explore another critical
requirement of the mobile advertising system: public accountability enforcement against
advertising misconducts, if (1) mobile users receive irrelevant ads, or (2) advertising policies
of merchants are not correctly computed in the ad dissemination process. This requires
the design of a composite Succinct Non-interactive ARGument (SNARG) system, that
can be tailored for different advertising transparency requirements and is efficient for the
blockchain implementations. Moreover, pursuing public accountability should also achieve
a strict privacy guarantee for the user profile. We also propose an accountability con-
tract which can receive explanation requirements from both mobile users and merchants.
To promote prompt on-chain responses, we design an incentive mechanism based on the
pre-deposits of involved parties, i.e., ad brokers, mobile users, and merchants. If any ad-
vertising misconduct is identified, public accountability can be enforced by confiscating
the pre-deposits of the misbehaving party. Comprehensive experiments and analyses are
conducted to demonstrate the versatile functionalities and feasibility of the accountability
contract.
In summary, we have designed, implemented, and evaluated a blockchain-based ar-
chitecture for security and privacy preservations in the mobile advertising. The designed
architecture can not only enhance the transparency and accountability for the mobile adver-
tising system, but has also achieved notably on-chain efficiency and privacy for real-world
implementations. The results from the thesis may shed light on the future research and
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Mobile advertising [1, 2] is a means of advertising technologies in the digital advertising
industry. It helps business to promote their products or services by disseminating cus-
tomized advertisements to mobile users through multiple mobile channels. For example,
a passenger can use her/his mobile phones to search nearby gas stations for trip planning
[3, 4]. A fitness woman/man can receive recommendations of training facilities and nutri-
tion plans from their smartwatches [5]. People staying at home may occasionally receive
pushes from the social media that recommends nearby restaurants.
With the rapid developments of mobile devices and applications, mobile services have
dominated people’s daily life. From the statistics [6], mobile traffic contributes 57 percent
of overall online traffic in U.S., 2017, which makes the mobile advertising the dominating
advertising technology compared with tradition advertising technology, e.g., newspaper,
TV, billboard [7]. Specifically, mobile advertising has its own characteristics:
B Personalized Advertising: Mobile advertising enables user personalization [8, 9] from
user interactions with mobile applications. For example, a user’s view and search
history of a hockey game may result in an advertisement of nearby NHL events. At
the same time, merchants can specify their advertisements with diversified advertising
content, e.g., message, flyer, in-app push, and different advertising strategies [10], e.g.,
exact keyword matching or broad keyword matching strategy in Google. By doing
so, advertising efficiency is greatly enhanced by disseminating ads only to targeted
mobile users.
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B Multi-channel Advertising: Mobile users are usually equipped with multiple mobile
devices. Through a universal Personally Identifiable Information (PII) [11], e.g.,
a primary email address, user information can travel cross boundaries of different
devices and applications. For example, a Google search at the tablet can result in a
Youtube recommendation at the smart phone. Therefore, mobile advertising is able
to better reach users anytime and anywhere.
B Location Awareness & Timeliness: Mobile devices are installed with location-based
sensors, e.g., Bluetooth [12] and Global Positing System (GPS). As a result, mobile
advertising can provide users with location-aware recommendations [13, 3] that may
lead to more in-store visits. Advertisers can also dynamically adjust their ad contents
based on context information, which can increase the user experience with the timely
and latest information, such as coupons and flyers.
As a result, mobile advertising is the dominating technology in the advertising industry
[14], that contributes 72 percent of overall digital advertising budget in U.S. by 2019 [6].
In the following, the commercialized mobile advertising model will be discussed in details.
1.1.1 Mobile Advertising Model
To achieve location-aware, timely, multi-channel, and personalized mobile advertising, it is
critical to develop a novel business model [3] for the success of both merchants and mobile
users. First, it is cost-ineffective for merchants, especially small businesses, to manage their
user databases and ad deliveries. Second, it is shown that mobile users spend most of their
time on the most popular apps, e.g., Google, Youtube, Facebook, WhatsApp. The above
characteristics of mobile ecosystem have resulted in a unique mobile advertising model,
which consists of three entities in its simplest form [10, 15]: mobile users, merchants, and
third-party ad brokers (denoted as ad network, alternatively).
B Mobile users are equipped with a wide range of mobile devices. They enjoy various
mobile services and can receive advertisements of related interests through multiple
channels, e.g., search engine, in-app pushes, and in-video display ads.
B Merchants would like to promote their businesses by disseminating targeted adver-
tisements. In the mobile advertising, merchants rely on third-party ad brokers to
manage user preferences and personalized advertising strategies.
2
B Ad brokers are third-party companies that serve critical roles in the mobile adver-
tising system. Ad brokers, e.g., Google and Facebook, build their own databases of
user profiles, manage ad contents and strategies for merchants, disseminate ads to
targeted mobile users and charge them for advertising dissemination services.
Merchants pay for the advertising services based on the per-click/view model [9]. Specif-
ically, ad brokers will charge merchants when mobile users view the ad contents or click
links in the ad. The third-party mobile advertising model has found many benefits. First,
merchants are free from managing their own ad campaigns. Second, ad brokers can fully
utilize their wealth of user data and provide effective and efficient advertising services for
merchants. As a result, it has been reported that 87 percent of advertising revenue of
Facebook comes from the mobile advertising services [6].
Specifically, the thesis mainly considers the following three processes of the mobile ad-
vertising system: user profiling, targeted ad dissemination, and feedback-driven marketing.
B User Profiling [16] is a means of collecting and managing user preference profiles.
To achieve personalized mobile advertising for more efficient ad dissemination, ad
brokers aim at profiling users into different advertising groups of interests. From
users’ interactions with mobile apps, e.g., web visits, shopping history and search
activities, ad brokers can assign mobile users with keyword tags. Keyword tags can
include user age, gender, interest, and locations. For example, mobile users can be
assigned with ‘basketball’, ‘beauty & fitness’ in Google Ads [17], if you view an NBA
video on Youtube or search a gym on Google map. Keywords can be categorized into
different subsets, such as sports and technology.
The reason behind the user profiling across different mobile applications is the utiliza-
tion of PII. Mobile users can use single-sign-on authentication across many applica-
tions. For example, mobile users can access multiple services, e.g., Youtube, Google
Map, Chrome with a universal Google account identified by an email address. If
mobile users turn on the ad personalization option [17], the ad brokers are able to
record user account activities to build ad preference files for mobile users.
B Targeted ad dissemination [18, 19] refers to the process of disseminating ads from
merchants to related mobile users. Similar to user preference profile, merchants also
choose a set of keywords as their targeting policies. Based on the merchant policy and
user profile, ad brokers can run the ad campaigns with keyword matching strategies
[17]. Specifically, merchants can adopt the broad matching strategy that uses fuzzy
matching techniques; or exact keyword/phase matching strategy that only counts
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exact matchings. Merchants can also choose where (applications) and how (banner,
video, in-app pushes) the ads are dissimilated to mobile users, e.g. display ads at
Google map or video ads at Youtube. Ad brokers collect ad impressions [20] from
mobile users and charge merchants based on per-click/view model.
B Feedback-driven marketing can help merchants to adjust their advertising strategy
and advertising budgets. For example, from ad impression reports of mobile users,
merchants can track down the number of mobile users who interact with their ad-
vertisements. Ad brokers can also provide merchants with aggregated statistics [21]
of their customers for better marketing decision makings. At the same time, mobile
user’s feedback also provides valuable reviews of the purchased services or products,
which plays an important role for merchants to promote their images and increase
sales.
The third-party mobile advertising model has been successful for many years, which lies
the foundation of the free Internet service model.
1.1.2 Advanced Use Cases
Recently, technical advances in the next generation wireless networks (5G) and Internet-
of-Things (IoT) are reshaping the mobile advertising [5] industry. With the developments
of 5G and IoT [22], smart devices are seamlessly connected anywhere and anytime. IoT
services, such as smart home and electronic healthy, are generating a large volume of per-
sonal data, which are of great value to merchants and ad brokers for better user profiling
and ad dissemination. Ultra high-speed and low-latency capabilities in 5G also enable
advertisers to provide mobile users with fruitful ad contents. For example, the emerging
multicasting services [23] can increase the overall bandwidth utilization for video broad-
casting advertisements [24]. The device-to-device (D2D) communication technology in 5G
networks [25] realizes efficient and reliable direct content sharing among peer users [26],
which can enhance the ad dissemination when the core network traffic is high.
Vehicular local advertising is a typical example of advanced mobile advertising services.
Modern smart vehicles are equipped with position sensors, communication modules [27, 28],
and in-vehicle multimedia systems. Vehicular users, e.g., drivers or passengers, can enjoy
location-based advertising services [29, 7] for effective trip planning and entertainment.
With the D2D technology, smart vehicles can also serve as the ad brokers [30] to directly
dissimilate ads via D2D channels or vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology.
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1.2 Security and Privacy Challenges
While the third-party mobile advertising model is enjoying its great economic success,
there have also been increasing concerns over the security and privacy issues in the system,
which may hinder the developments of the mobile advertising if without proper coun-
termeasures. First, there are multiple stakeholders in the mobile advertising system: ad
brokers, mobile users, merchants, application developers, and technology vendors [31]. The
stakeholders, especially ad brokers and merchants, are usually profit-driven and would like
to maximize their revenues as much as possible. Second, there are multiple processes in
the mobile advertising system, from user profiling to feed-back driven marketing, which
makes it complicated to manage and audit. Third, multiple end devices are involved in the
mobile advertising, especially for the Android ecosystems. As a result, there is no univer-
sal ad library [32] for developers, which increases the risk of software vulnerability. In the
following, security and privacy threats of the mobile advertising system are summarized.
1.2.1 Security Threats
B Fake advertisement. Dishonest merchants (advertisers) may not provide correct in-
formation about their services or products. In the social media advertising [33], no
mandatory requirement is enforced for advertisers to register with true identities. At
the same time, there is a lack of an efficient mechanism for checking the ad content.
As a result, mobile users often receive annoying advertisements that are inaccurate,
biased, or even misleading.
B Malvertising. The ad broker is usually a multi-sector profit-driven company, which
may not always follow the pre-determined advertising strategy or provide insufficient
scrutiny for malicious mobile applications. As a result, malvertising may embed links
to scam webpages or cause downloads of malware [34]. This significantly increases
the financial and privacy risk for mobile users in the mobile advertising system.
B Ad-fraud attack. Ad brokers collect ad impressions to charge merchants for advertis-
ing services. For third-party applications, developers can get revenue for displaying
ad contents for ad brokers [15]. Therefore, it is highly motivated for developers to
fake ad impressions for more revenues [35]. At the same time, dishonest or Sybil
mobile users could also generate fake ad impressions. Ad-fraud attacks can greatly
affect merchant confidence in the mobile advertising system, thereby resulting in a
decrease of advertising investments.
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B Dishonest review. The mobile advertising relies on the review system to provide user
feedback to improve service quality. In some cases, user reviews can serve as the
purpose of advertisements. For example, when users search a restaurant in Google
map or Yelp, users are likely to view the reviews before dropping by the restaurant.
Dishonest users may collude with merchants to conduct various attacks [36] against
the review system, such as whitewashing and fake review [37], which may jeopardize
the trustworthiness of the marketing place.
1.2.2 Privacy Threats
B User profiling requires statistics gathering of personal user activities [38], which may
contain user location, personal interest, and search history. Mobile users are also
tracked cross devices by device identifiers and global IDs [39]. The gathered statistics
are considered as user private information that may reveal user habits, daily routines,
and health status.
B Ad impression reporting requires ad brokers to collect mobile user view/click history
of the advertisements for charging purposes [20]. The ad impressions may also contain
user browsing history that should be prevented from being exposed to the adversaries.
B User feedbacks and reviews may reveal their shopping history and locations, which
may result in the leakage of personal information. At the same time, users may be
reluctant to leave negative feedback for the fear of the consequences [36].
1.3 Research Motivations and Challenges
Security and privacy threats are hindering the developments of the mobile advertising
system. Ad-fraud attacks are costing money, which is predicted to be 43 billion US dollars
in 2019 by TrafficGuard/Juniper [40]. Fake advertisements are annoying mobile users and
driving them to turn off the ad personalization while dishonest reviews are reducing user
confidence in the marketing place. For the privacy threats, as European General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [41] takes effects, strict legal requirements on collecting,
storing, and sharing user personal data are enforced. That is, mobile users are granted
the legal rights to fully control their personal data, which drives the mobile advertising
industry to update its privacy policies.
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Extensive research efforts have been directed to the solutions to the security and privacy
threats of the mobile advertising. The thesis investigates the mobile advertising system
from an architecture perspective and addresses the fundamental reason behind the men-
tioned threats: lack of system transparency [42]. Specifically, the advertising transparency
requires advertising policies and processes are open and verifiable to the involved parties,
e.g., mobile users and merchants.
B Mobile users should be aware of their preference profiles: how they are tracked cross
different devices and why they are assigning the keyword tags.
B Advertising policy should be transparent to mobile users [43]. Mobile users are
annoyed when they receive biased or even misleading ads, which may result in the
increasing popularity of the ad-blocking software [44].
B Ad dissemination process should be verifiable to both the mobile users and merchants.
Mobile users should know why they receive a specific ad [33] while merchants should
know their ads reach targeted mobile users.
B Review system should be open and transparent to the public, where the accumulation
process of each merchant should be verifiable by mobile users.
By increasing the advertising transparency, it motivates the involved parties to follow
the pre-determined advertising protocol and build a reliable advertising system. The pub-
lic awareness of advertising activities can also be enhanced, which pushes the stakeholders
to take effective and efficient actions against any advertising misconduct. Therefore, it
is urgent to design a transparent advertising system to address the security and privacy
threats at the architecture level. Ad brokers are making their efforts to increase the system
transparency by providing users with more explanations [43, 33]. At the same time, many
research efforts have been put into increasing the transparency of user profiling, ad dis-
semination, and marketing, which may rely on web extensions [42], independent auditors
[45], and trusted hardware [46]. The above solutions assume the trust of a single authority,
which can sometimes be untrustworthy. For example, major ad brokers are reported to
pay for blocking software to be put into the white list [47].
A decentralized solution that relies on distributed consensus is more promising for a
transparent and reliable mobile advertising system [36, 48]. Originated in its success from
electronic cash [49], blockchain is a distributed ledger maintained by mutually distrustful
peer nodes, that is transparent, immutable, and open. There have been discussions on
utilizing the blockchain to serve the role of ad broker [48, 50] or a marketing place [48] with
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early industrial attempts [51], e.g., AdChain [52]. Specifically, a blockchain-based mobile
advertising system has found the following benefits: (1) transparent and controllable user
profiling. (2) verifiable ad dissemination and charging. (3) open and reliable review system
[53, 51]. However, building a blockchain-based mobile advertising system also faces non-
trivial obstacles:
B Efficiency. The distributed consensus of the blockchain comes at the cost of system
efficiency, in terms of transaction throughput and confirmation time. In a public
blockchain, e.g. Bitcoin and Ethereum, every transaction needs to be verified and
stored at each miner node. In a consortium blockchain [54], transactions are verified
by validating nodes. Considering the large volume of advertising data, a straight-
forward approach to utilize the blockchain may pose prohibitive computation and
communication costs, which motivates the first design challenge in this thesis: a
blockchain-based mobile advertising system with practical designs.
B Privacy. The open nature of the blockchain makes it suitable to increase the adver-
tising transparency. At the same time, user profiles and ad impressions are required
to be kept private by the emerging privacy regulations, which creates a conflict with
the blockchain transparency. Therefore, how to design a blockchain-based mobile
advertising system that strikes a notable balance between system transparency and
user privacy is another challenge that the thesis aims to resolve.
1.4 Research Contributions
The thesis focuses on addressing the security and privacy threats in the mobile advertising
system by increasing the advertising transparency. Specifically, the thesis aims at building
a blockchain-based architecture that is compatible with the current mobile advertising
system and resolves the design challenges of the efficiency and privacy requirements with
practical design and feasible implementations. The main contributions of this thesis are
summarized as follows:
B The thesis proposes an anonymous reputation system that preserves consumer iden-
tities and individual review confidentialities. To increase system transparency and
reliability, the thesis further exploits the tamper-proof nature and the distributed
consensus mechanism of blockchain technology. With system designs based on var-
ious cryptographic primitives and a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus protocol, the
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proposed blockchain-based reputation system is more efficient to offer high levels
of privacy guarantees compared with existing ones. Finally, the thesis explores the
implementation challenges of the blockchain-based architecture and present a proof-
of-concept prototype system by Parity Ethereum. The thesis measures the on/off-
chain performance with the scalability discussion to demonstrate the feasibility of
the proposed reputation system.
B The thesis develops a transparent and accountable vehicular local advertising system
by utilizing the blockchain technology. Considering the prohibitive cost of directly
implementing a large-scale advertising system on the blockchain, the thesis intro-
duces two design strategies, digest-and-verify and divide-then-assemble. In specific,
a large-scale spatial keyword database is digested and stored on the blockchain with
succinct cryptographic authenticators. The ad dissemination is then conducted with
modular executions of two off-chain spatial keyword query functions, the results of
which are assembled and verified in an advertising smart contract using the stored
authenticators. By doing so, expensive on-chain computation and storage overheads
are significantly reduced at a cost of acceptable off-chain overheads. The thesis
formalizes the security requirements of the vehicular local advertising system as Au-
diting Security and achieves the notion with thorough security analysis. Extensive
experiments are conducted to demonstrate the practicality of the blockchain-based
vehicular local advertising system.
B The thesis proposes a blockchain-based Smart Advertising Network with Privacy-
preserving Accountability (SANPA). Specifically, the thesis designs a composite Suc-
cinct Non-interactive Argument (SNARG) system, that commits advertising policies
as cryptographic authenticators in a smart contract. By doing so, SANPA is compat-
ible with the existing SAN without posing prohibitive implementation cost over the
blockchain architecture. Users or retailers can require explanations of an advertising
activity by sending a challenge to the smart contract. With the succinctness and
privacy preservation of SNARG system, the contract can efficiently verify whether
the challenged advertising activity follows committed policies without exposing user
profile privacy. If the misconduct is identified, the contract enforces public account-
ability on the involved parties by confiscating their cryptocurrency deposits. The
thesis conducts extensive experiments to provide both on-chain and off-chain bench-
marks, which demonstrates the application feasibility of SANPA.
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1.5 Outline of this Thesis
The organization of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive survey of
related literature on the security and privacy issues of the mobile advertising system and the
blockchain techniques with applications to public accountability infrastructure. Chapter 3
presents the first research contribution: Anonymous Reputation System for IIoT-enabled
Retail Marketing atop PoS Blockchain. Chapter 4 presents the second research contribu-
tion: Transparent and Accountable Vehicular Local Advertising with Practical Blockchain
Designs. Chapter 5 presents the third research contribution: Exploiting Blockchain for
Transparent Mobile Advertising with Privacy-preserving Accountability. Chapter 6 sum-




In this chapter, we review the state-of-the-art literature regarding security and privacy
challenges and solutions in mobile advertising. Specifically, we first review the solutions
based on trusted single authorities. Then, we discuss the basics of the blockchain tech-
nologies with their applications to enhancing trust and transparency in mobile advertising
systems. Finally, we review the non-interactive cryptographic argument techniques.
2.1 Security and Transparency for Mobile Advertis-
ing
Extensive research efforts have been put into increasing the security and transparency for
the mobile advertising, including comprehensive surveys [43, 33], intelligent web extensions
[42], third-party explainers [45], and trusted hardware [46].
Son et al. [39] carefully studied the implementations of ad libraries in Android systems.
The authors identified specific interfaces that can be utilized by third-party developers to
infer user personal information during the advertising. Their findings highlighted the es-
sentiality for the current mobile advertising system to increase security measures against
malicious developers. Gui et al. [55] collected and analyzed a large volume of ad complaints
from advertising users. Their results revealed the users’ lack of confidence in the content
and relevance of the received ads, which could lead to the installation of ad-blocking soft-
ware. Chen et al. [34] conducted an extensive analysis of the existing mobile apps and
ads. Their results showed the prevalence of fraud or irrelevant ads and an urgent need for
a more transparent and accountable advertising system. Andreou et al. [43] investigated
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the transparency explanations of Facebook advertising, regarding how a user is labeled
with attributes and why the user receives a specific ad. By collecting a large amount of
explanation data from different users, the authors concluded that the transparency expla-
nations by the brokers are often incomplete, vague, and even misleading. Later, Andreou et
al. [33] investigated the behavior of advertisers in social network advertising. The results
demonstrated the need for an effective and efficient mechanism to publicly audit advertiser
activities and enforce accountability against advertising misconduct.
Many research works have been directed to develop countermeasures against ad-fraud
attacks. Ad-fraud attacks are conducted by malicious application developers who fake
user click/view for charging merchants for advertising display. Crussell et al. [32] made
the efforts to adopt machine-learning based traffic analysis techniques and identify fake
ad impressions. Specifically, the proposed scheme automatically investigated two types of
ad-fraud attacks: ad impression reporting with hidden app running or without user interac-
tion. Shao et al. [56] investigated the interface between mobile apps and web pages to study
the hidden mobile attacks and frauds. The proposed system helps mobile users identify
the accountability of publishers or the ad broker. The study presented an overall overview
of malicious applications, which demonstrated the need of pursuing joint accountability of
application developers, web owners, and the ad broker. Dong et al. [57] identified various
types of mobile ad-fraud attacks and designed an automatic fraud detection framework
based on UI state transitions and android application analysis techniques. Specifically, the
proposed framework dynamically evaluated the UI state transitions to detect hidden ad
displays with scalable and accurate detection rates. Jin et al. [58] conducted a comprehen-
sive study of ad libraries in existing ad broker, which identifies the main characteristics of
ad libraries that may have impacts on the mobile ad-fraud attacks. The proposed scheme
investigated the ad libraries in an API level to provide a comprehensive classification of ad
types and API interfaces. Chen et al. [34] studied the relationship between click frauds and
malvertising and proposed an integrated framework that captures ad traffics and detect
malicious ads.
At the same time, researchers have made their efforts on increasing the transparency of
the current advertising system to regain user and merchant confidence. Li et al. [46] used
trusted hardware techniques (ARM trusted zone) to propose a verifiable advertisements
click and display framework on mobile applications. The proposed method not only in-
creased the advertising transparency but enhanced the prevention of ad-fraud attacks. Jin
et al. [18] designed a web extension to manage the flow charts, that explains to users the ad
selection and profile control processes. The use of web extensions to manage the advertising
system provides mobile users with easy-to-implement choices for advertising transparency
explanations. Parra-Arnau et al. [42] developed a detection system that looks into users’
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web browser profile with a measurement scheme for user profile uniqueness, which enables
configurable and flexible transparency options for web users. The designed web extension
also provides users with selective transparency and ad blockading options. Venkatadri et
al. [45] utilized a third-party organization as a transparency explainer to manage the trans-
parency explanations for users. Specifically, the third-party explainer will respond to user
request of transparency explanations by collecting advertising policies and investigating
the targeting process on the ad network without learning additional user information.
To summarize this subchapter, the security and transparency issues of the mobile ad-
vertising system have attracted research works from different perspectives. Different from
the existing methods that rely either on a single authority or software, this thesis explores a
different path to investigate the challenges and solutions of a distributed blockchain-based
solution for the mobile advertising system. By doing so, the public transparency could be
significantly increased for the advertising system.
2.2 Privacy-preserving Mobile Advertising
The subchapter reviews recent research activities on designing privacy-preserving adver-
tising systems for mobile users, including the user profiling, the targeted advertising [19],
and the private ad impression report. Moreover, the subchapter investigates the privacy
regulations and their impacts on the mobile advertising system.
Private user profiling and targeted advertising have attracted extensive research efforts.
Guha et al. [59] investigated the privacy-preserving targeted advertising issue by introduc-
ing a new entity, i.e., dealer, between the users and the ad brokers. The dealer anonymizes
the users by breaking the linkability between users and their profiles and enabling private
reporting of ad impressions. Backes et al. [60] studied the privacy issues in Online Be-
havior Advertising (OBA). Specifically, the proposed scheme utilized Private Information
Retrieval (PIR) [61] for private ad dissemination and oblivious token techniques for ad im-
pression reporting. From the cryptographic primitives, the proposed scheme also achieved
provably security for the advertising system. Hardt et al. [38] exploited the differential pri-
vacy technique [62] for private advertising statistics aggregation and reporting to identify
the critical tradeoffs between user privacy and ad personalization accuracy. Davidson et
al. [63] increased the user profile privacy by shifting the computations of ad disseminations
to the client side, therefore decreasing the amount of data that leaves users’ devices. Jiang
et al. [10] proposed a private targeted advertising system based on Private Stream Search-
ing [64] to protect user profile privacy. The proposed scheme also utilized homomorphic
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encryptions to break the role of the ad brokers in ad impression reporting to protect user
impression privacy.
Toubiana et al. [9] pried into the private ad impression issue if there is a malicious
user that does not honestly report ad click/view statistics. Based on the zero-knowledge
proof technique, the proposed scheme enables the users to prove the correctness of their
impression reporting without leaving individual statistics. Green et al. [20] further in-
vestigated the scalability issue for private ad impression reporting based on an efficient
zero proof technique [65] with some optimization techniques. Qian et al. [66] also studied
the selective ad impression aggregation issue with novel designs from differential privacy
and homomorphic encryptions. As the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) takes
effect in 2018 [41], strict restrictions on mobile applications to share personal user data
with third-party ad brokers are enforced. Specifically, GDPR defines rights of personal
users, e.g. right to be informed and right to be forgotten, that must be protected in the
advertising system. Urban et al. [31] further discussed the impacts of GDPR on the data
sharing and usage of cookies on the advertising industry.
To summarize this subchapter, state-of-the-art literature has explored a wide range
of techniques in real-word practices to achieve a privacy-preserving advertising system.
Different from the existing literature, this thesis utilizes the blockchain-based architecture
for the mobile advertising with inherent transparency and openness nature. Thus, how to
enjoy the benefits of the blockchain while preserving user profile and impression privacy is
one of the main challenges in this thesis.
2.3 Privacy-preserving Reputation System
Trust and reputation management is becoming prevalent for the success of a global mar-
keting system [67, 68]. People are used to referring to reviews of a product or a shop before
their shoppings. This subchapter reviews the research advances on building a trusted and
transparent reputation system [69, 70, 37, 71, 72].
Blomer et al. [70] proposed a reputation system based on group signature technique.
The proposed scheme enables users to leave an anonymous review for a product or service.
Motivated by [70], Blomer et al. [37] further proposed a feedback-driven reputation system
with public linkability. The main goal of the proposed system [37] is to preserve consumer
anonymity while preventing the double-review attack. The proposed scheme formalized
the security requirement of the anonymous reputation system with comprehensive proofs.
Bag et al. [73] proposed a personalized reputation system taking into consideration of
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the trustworthiness of consumers. Specifically, the proposed scheme utilized homomorphic
encryptions with non-interactive zero-knowledge proof technique to preserve the individual
review of each user. Bazin et al. [72] designed a feedback-driven reputation system with
secure rating aggregations. Non-interactive zero proof technique [74] was combined with
blind signature in [72] to achieve consumer anonymity. Zhai et al. [69] proposed a tracking-
resistant anonymous reputation system by leveraging an anonymity provider with mix-net
technology. By doing so, the proposed scheme can break the links between the original
user review and mixed ones, therefore concealing the individual review statistics. Azad
et al. [71] utilized a homomorphic cryptographic system and the non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof to design a decentralized reputation system with individual rating score
confidentiality.
To summarize this subchapter, existing literature for blockchain-based reputation sys-
tems has achieved a variety of properties such as anonymity, decentralization, and system
transparency. Due to the lack of mutual trust among mobile advertising system and profit
considerations, a distributed reputation system with verifiable transparency is preferred.
This thesis takes advantage of the blockchain technology for a trustworthy reputation
system in a fully distrustful environment. At the same time, the thesis addresses the im-
plementation challenges in the design of the reputation system to achieve compatibility
with existing blockchain platforms.
2.4 Blockchain and Smart Contract
The blockchain is a distributed ledger maintained by a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, where
each participant can send transactions to another without going through a centralized au-
thority. Specifically, blockchain is a chain of blocks that are chained together by secure hash
functions [75]. Each block consists of a number of P2P transactions that directly transfer
cryptocurrencies from the sender to the receiver(s). The blockchain adopts consensus pro-
tocols among participants to help them maintain a consistent view of the distributed ledger.
Compared with traditional distributed system, the blockchain motivates the participants
to join the maintenance of the blockchain by providing reward mechanisms [76, 77].
The blockchain is first introduced as the underlying infrastructure of the digital currency
Bitcoin [49] in 2009. Digital currency [78], also known as electronic cash, is the divisible
and unforgeable virtual currency with exchange values. Bitcoin is the digital currency
network with the following characterizes:
B Distribution: There is no centralized authority in the pure P2P Bitcoin network.
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B Openness: The Bitcoin network is an open-source project. Any network peer can
join the Bitcoin network.
B Anonymity: A participant of the Bitcoin network only provides a pseudonym and a
unique public/secret key pair [79].
B Transparency: Any transaction in the Bitcoin is publicly verifiable to the whole
network.
B Immutability: Any transaction that is confirmed in the Bitcoin network cannot be
later modified, which makes the Bitcoin an append-only ledger.
B Consistency: Every participant of the Bitcoin network should maintain the same
view of the shared ledger.
B Double-spending prevention: No malicious participant can spend the same digital
currency at different transactions.
In each block of the Bitcoin, there are a few transactions included with a compact
Merkle proof [80]. Each block also consists of a hash digest of the previous block. Since
there is no centralized authority to record financial information (remaining balance, trans-
action history, etc.), the Bitcoin adopts the unspent transaction output (UTOX) to manage
P2P transactions [49]. Specifically, a sender can prove to the public that she is the owner of
a few UTOX with a digital signature. Then, the sender includes the UTOX and the address
of the receiver into a transaction, digitally uses the private key to sign the transaction. The
sender finally sends the signed transaction to the blockchain network [49].
There may be different participants proposing transactions at the same time. Therefore,
it is critical to determine the next valid transactions for the ledger. This is determined
by the consensus protocol in the Bitcoin, e.g. Proof of Work (PoW) [76] and Proof of
Stake (PoS) [77]. A special participant in the Bitcoin is called miner, who is responsible
for collecting, verifying, and proposing the next block of the Bitcoin network. In PoW,
different miners compete to solve a hash puzzle. In PoS, a set of slot leaders are randomly
determined from miners, each of which will collect and propose the block at her time slot.
The Bitcoin rewards the miner who proposes the next block with 25 bitcoins. By doing
so, miners are motivated to maintain the correctness and integrity of the Bitcoin network.
Etherem [81] is another distributed blockchain network that supports its own digital
currencies, i.e. Ether. It shares many common features with the Bitcoin, e.g. anonymity,
openness, transparency, etc. However, Ethereum implements an account-based model [81]
instead of the UTXO model in the Bitcoin. It is observed that the blockchain can be
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regarded as a state machine, where each successful transaction changes the blockchain from
one state to another. Ethereum first introduced the smart contract [82] to the blockchain
network, which is a trusted computer program. The smart contract specifies the terms and
conditions of involved parties (blockchain participants) and can take actions (transferring
cryptocurrencies) when conditions are met. In Ethereum, a smart contract is a special
address on the blockchain network with data and codes stored. Each Ethereum node call
contract functions by sending transactions with the data to the contract address. Compared
with a traditional contract, the Ethereum smart contract has the following features [83]:
B Trustworthy witness: Benefiting from the transparency and immutability nature of
the blockchain, the integrity and authenticity of a smart contract is ensured.
B Automatic execution: Ehtereum ensures that a valid transaction will be confirmed
in the ledger within a threshold time. Therefore, efficient and automatic contract
execution is ensured in the smart contract.
Smart contract is suitable for many applications, such as supply chain management [84, 85],
and digital goods exchange [86].
Both the Bitcoin and Ethereum have been successful by building trust among distrustful
peer nodes. At the same time, the underlying public blockchain infrastructure also raises
concerns over its efficiency and scalability [87]. For example, the block time (time between
two consecutive confirmed blocks) in Bitcoin is around 10 minutes and average of about
12,000 transactions are confirmed per hour [88]. In contrast to the public blockchain,
consortium or private blockchain [54, 89] is proposed for industrial applications, where there
exists a certain degree of trust between industrial partners [84]. Compared with the public
blockchain, consortium or private blockchain enforces identity and access management for
the network participants. For example, a group of financial institutions can utilize the
consortium blockchain for efficient reconciliations.
To realize the promises of the blockchain technology, extensive research efforts have
been directed to increase its scalability while addressing security and privacy issues [90, 91].
Blockchain sharding [92] was proposed to enable parallel processing of the ledgers. Another
research line focused on separating on-chain and off-chain blockchain computations [93, 94].
For example, off-chain payment channels [95] could be established to process a number of
transactions before uploading the transactions to the ledger. At the same time, privacy
is also a primary concern for many blockchain-based applications. For example, users
would not like to expose their transaction history to the public since it may contain some
sensitive information [96]. Terms and conditions in a smart contract could also be sensitive
17
and should be concealed from the public view, which motivated the research of privacy-
preserving smart contract [97].
To summarize this subchapter, blockchain is a promising technology that promotes
trusted and transparent consensus in distributed systems. However, there still remain
some unresolved privacy and efficiency issues. This thesis aims at adopting the blockchain
technology for a more reliable and transparent mobile advertising system while address-
ing two challenges at the same time: practical designs and privacy-preserving yet public
accountability.
2.5 Blockchain-based Accountability Infrastructure
The practices of building a blockchain-based accountability architecture have been explored
in a wide range of application scenarios, such as personal data sharing [98, 99], transparent
legal systems [100], vehicular forensics [101], Internet of Things (IoT) [102], and protocol
accountability verifications [103].
Frankle et al. [100] investigated the accountability issues in a secret process of a court
system, such as the surveillance of a criminal target. The authors utilized the public
ledger and multi-party computation techniques to achieve the system transparency and
target privacy at the same time. Li et al. [101] constructed a blockchain-based vehicular
forensics framework that enforces accountability and fine-grained access control over the
forensics data. The authors built a distributed Key Policy Attribute-based Encryption
(KP-ABE) scheme that prevents dishonest agencies to abuse the power. Neisse et al.
[98] studied the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for personal data usages
and proposed a blockchain-based framework that realized personal data accountability
and provenance tracking. Wu et al. [99] further pried into the detailed policy of GDPR
in terms of transparency and compliance requirements. The authors proposed an offline
channel and business relationship model for a blockchain-based architecture to boost the
system scalability. Boudguiga et al. [102] adopted the blockchain to achieve the secure
updates of the objects or nodes in the IoT. The proposed scheme increased the availability
and accountability of the IoT system with a transparent ledger.
Li et al. [104] proposed a blockchain-based carpooling system, which boosted the in-
formation exchange among carpooling companies and ensured the carpooling user privacy.
The authors adopted anonymous credential technique in the blockchain to achieve trans-
parent and privacy-preserving collaborative carpooling system. Li et al. [30] proposed a
blockchain-assisted ad dissemination scheme, which motivated the vehicles in road net-
works to act as ad brokers with fair rewards for ad dissemination services. Zhang et al.
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[105] proposed a blockchain-based public-key searchable encryption scheme. The proposed
scheme utilized the blockchain as a trusted storage and addressed the keyword guessing
attacks for the searchable encryption. Li et al. [106] developed a transparent crowdsourc-
ing framework based on the Ethereum smart contract. The designed and implemented
framework provided comprehensive benchmarks for future research in the blockchain-based
crowdsourcing applications. Lu et al. [107] designed a privacy-preserving crowdsourcing
framework based on the blockchain and the anonymous credential technique, which ad-
dressed the conflicts between blockchain transparency and user privacy. Dorri et al. [108]
proposed a blockchain-based framework for automobile services in vehicular networks. Liu
et al. [109] designed a blockchain-based solution for distributed network provenance. The
proposed scheme ensures the integrity and correctness of cross-domain provenance queries
between network administrators. Frey et al. [110] proposed a blockchain-based recommen-
dation system for the e-commerce system. Nguyen et al. [111] utilized the blockchain to
construct a geo-marketplace for trading location data in a transparent manner.
To build a more transparent marketplace [112, 113], blockchain technologies have been
exploited for reputation system construction [114, 36]. Schaub et al. [114] proposed a
fully decentralized reputation system atop a public blockchain with the blind signature
technique to achieve consumer anonymity. Soska et al. [36] proposed an anonymous
reputation system based on the ring signature and the robust transaction chain property of
the blockchain technology. There have been recent advances on building blockchain-based
searchable encryption schemes. Hu et al. [115] utilized the smart contract to construct a
symmetric searchable encryption scheme. The proposed scheme achieves the verifiability
of search results from the transparency of the Ethereum blockchain. Xu et al. [116]
designed a compact authenticated structure for searchable indexes that supports rich search
functionalities on the blockchain. The proposed scheme also explored the implementation
challenges by desiring cross-block authenticated indexes.
To summarize this subchapter, extensive research works have been directed to utilize
the blockchain technology to increase the transparency and accountability of the existing
systems. At the same time, practical implementation issues of the blockchain technologies.
e.g. scalability and privacy, pose significant challenges when applying the blockchain to
the mobile advertising system.
2.6 Non-interactive Argument
Non-interactive Argument NArg [117, 118] enables a prover to prove to a verifier that an
instance (x,w) with a statement x and a witness w satisfies a (public) relation R. NArg
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is widely used in many applications, e.g. digital signature [79], anonymous credential [119,
120, 121], and verifiable computations [122]. Recently, NArg systems are lively research
areas due to the booming trends of the blockchain. This thesis focuses on a research
line of NArg systems in bilinear groups, that recognize the Quadratic Arithmetic Program
(QAP)-based relations and the low-degree algebra relations. A NArg scheme should achieve
soundness, complexness and non-interactive. Informally, soundness ensures that a prover
cannot forge an instance (x′, w′) that is not in R to pass the vesication. Completeness
guarantees that an honest verifier always accepts correct instances (x,w). Non-interactive
requires NArg to be an one-move proof system. NArg can achieve zero-knowledge by
concealing instances (x,w) in the verification.
2.6.1 Low-degree Polynomial Relations
NArg for low-degree polynomial relations can be efficiently instantiated in elliptic curve
groups equipped with bilinear pairings [123, 124]. This thesis only considers knowledge
in the exponent with Pedersen commitment schemes [125] and single discrete logarithms
[74, 126]. If we denote G = (G1,G2,GT ) with a prime order p and generators g1, g2, ..., gn ∈
Gn1 . A few examples of such relations are shown as follows:
B Given public parameters ga1 , g
a
2 and secrets a ∈ Zp, a NArg system proves that ga1 and
ga2 contain the same secret a.




3 and secrets a, b, c ∈ Z3p, a NArg system proves that
c = a+ b.








i , a NArg system proves that (b1, b2, ..., bn) ∈
Znp is a permutation of (a1, a2, ..., an) ∈ Znp .
With the homomorphic property of the Pedersen commitment, additions in the ex-
ponent can be efficiently implemented. With a bilinear pairing, an multiplication in the
exponents can be efficiently implemented. Generally, a three-move public-coin Sigma pro-
tocol with pre-image based proof techniques [74] can be converted to the non-interactive
setting with Fiat-Shamir heuristics [127]. In the following, the thesis reviews how the NArg
systems for different polynomial relations in the discrete logarithm setting are realized.
Pointcheva and Sanders [128] constructed a novel group signature scheme with applica-
tions to anonymous credentials, which is a proof of knowledge of a signature in the discrete
logarithm setting. The proposed scheme [128] achieves a short proof size, which makes it
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more suitable for blockchain-based applications. Later, the construction of the PS signa-
ture [128] was improved in [119] to achieve security properties based on non-interactive
assumptions. Bootle et al. [129] constructed an efficient NArg system for arithmetic cir-
cuit evaluations in bilinear groups. At the heart of their design is a zero-knowledge proof
system for inner product evaluations. With the inner-product technique, a polynomial
evaluation is constructed for evaluating a circuit with logarithmic complexities. Subse-
quently, Bunz et al. [130] constructed an efficient range proof technique that convinces
the verifier that a commitment lies in a certain range. The proposed Bulletproof system
also supports proof aggregations, which makes it suitable for e-cash applications. Bootle
et al. [131] further improve the previous work [129] for low-degree polynomials with batch
techniques. Damgaard et al. [132] developed a zero-knowledge proof system for Hamming
weight evaluations for a set of Pedersen commitments. The novel polynomial evaluation
technique in [132] achieves a proof system with a compact proof size. Lai et al. [133]
constructed a set of proof systems for vector commitments from various assumptions, e.g.
Root assumption or CDH. The proposed scheme supports opening a vector commitment
at given positions and can also evaluate linear combinations of the vector commitments.
The proof system in the discrete logarithm requires no trusted setup of the public
parameters. At the same time, the complexity of such systems, in terms of prover and
verifier, is often linear or logarithmic with the size of the polynomial relations.
2.6.2 Quadratic Arithmetic Program-based Relations
Arithmetic circuit evaluation can be recognized by a Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP).
A QAP consists of three sets of polynomials constructed from the original arithmetic cir-
cuit. Given the assigned values of each I/O and each intermediate gate of the circuit,
the QAP evaluates the three sets of polynomials and conducts a divisibility check with a
targeted polynomial. This results in the evaluations in bilinear groups with parings, which
is also denoted as Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-
SNARK) in the literature. In the following, the thesis summarizes the research progress
of QAP -based argument systems with applications to veritable computations.
Gennaro et al. [134] exploited the QAP theory for arithmetic circuit evaluations, which
converts the circuit evaluation to a low-degree divisibility check in bilinear groups. The
proposed SNARG system is non-interactive and succinct, which results in the notable
storage and computation efficiency at the verifier and thus makes it suitable for blockchain-
based applications where on-chain storage and computation are expensive. Subsequently,
Parno et al. [122] constructed a more efficient QAP scheme, that reduced the degree
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of compiled programs, the key size and prover computation overhead. Parno et al. also
proposed a comprehensive framework that can compile a subset of C programs into a QAP,
which resulted in practical verifiable computations for general relations. Ben-Sasson et al.
[135] designed a framework for verifiable C program executions from linear probabilistically-
checkable proofs. Ben-Sasson et al. [136] also proposed a set of optimization techniques to
improve the computation and storage efficiency of the Pinocchio framework [122]. Costello
et al. [137] extended the QAP to multi-QAP that enables multiple uses of the same data
across different loops, which reduced the circuit size and prover computation overhead.
Later, Groth et al. [138] constructed new instantiations of the QAP -based proof system,
which greatly reduced the proof size and verifier computation overheads with only a few
group elements in the proof. Kosba et al. [139] further designed a JAVA programming
framework that improved the program-to-circuit interface with more compact circuit size.
The proposed framework utilized the libsnark library [140] as the backend for proof systems.
Compared with the NArg system in the discrete logarithm setting, the main feature of
the QAP -based NArug system is the verifier efficiency. For example, succinct proof sizes
and verification costs are achieved in [138]. However, QAP -based NArug system requires
a trusted setup of the common reference strings since a trapdoor secret s is used in the
setup phase. Moreover, QAP -based NArug system utilizes general circuit constructions,
which makes it less efficient for specialized relations, e.g. proof of knowledge of a signature
in elliptic curve groups.
2.6.3 Composite Arguments
Since different relations can be efficiently instantiated with different NArg systems, it is
promising to carefully design a campsite argument system that combines the advantages
of different techniques.
Fiore et al. [141] utilized the multi-exponentiation component in the proof of zk-SNARK
systems, that is actually an extended Pedersen commitment of the circuit input and can
be reused multiple times for different instances. A hash-and-prove scheme was proposed in
[141] for outsourced verifiable computations. Chase et al. [142] proposed a zero-knowledge
proof system that combines traditional Sigma protocol with the zk-SNARK techniques.
The proposed scheme finds many interesting applications, e.g. proof of knowledge of a
signature if the message is first hashed. Later, Agrawal et al. [143] formalized composite
arguments, that utilized zk-SNARK as the core computing component with committed
inputs/outputs based on traditional Sigma protocols in the discrete logarithms. Campanelli
et al. [144] proposed a framework with modular utilizations of NArg systems from QAP -
based relations and polynomial relations.
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To summarize this subchapter, non-interactive argument systems are powerful tech-
niques that enable verifiable computations and the proof of knowledge for polynomial
relations. At the same time, the complexity of the current mobile advertising system, e.g.
various privacy and transparency requirements for different processes, raises many chal-
lenges in designing a versatile and efficient argument system. Therefore, the thesis carefully
tailors the design of non-interactive argument systems to achieve the rich functionalities
in the mobile advertising system with strong security, privacy, and efficiency guarantees.
2.7 Summary
This chapter reviews the existing works that are closely related to this thesis. First, the
chapter discusses the security and transparency issues in current mobile advertising sys-
tems with state-of-the-art technical solutions. Second, the chapter presents the privacy
issues and review the research lines of privacy-preserving advertising systems. Third, the
chapter studies the basics of the blockchain and smart contract technologies with applica-
tions to trusted accountability infrastructures for distributed systems. Finally, the chapter
investigates the NArug techniques in the discrete logarithms and QAP -based relations
from bilinear pairings with different use cases.
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Chapter 3
Anonymous Reputation System for
IIoT-enabled Retail Marketing atop
PoS Blockchain
3.1 Background
Industrial Internet-of-Things (IIoT) [145], which consists of a global network of smart ob-
jects, is reshaping and revolutionizing the retail industry [146]. In a global retail ecosystem,
suppliers, manufactures, and retailers are adopting IIoT to improve manufacturing opera-
tional efficiency and reduce supply-chain management cost [147, 85]. Leveraged with cloud
computing and big data technologies, IIoT is also envisioned to benefit the retail market-
ing that speaks to the needs of competitive market globalization and consumer demand
diversification [147]. With the help of IIoT technology, retailers are able to collect mas-
sive feedbacks from various sources and devices, which can help them better manage their
business. In particular, consumer feedbacks play a critical role for retailers to establish
reputations among industrial partners and build consumer confidence [148]. Specifically,
consumers are allowed to leave feedbacks (usually a rating score and/or a review message)
for their experiences with retailers [36]. These feedbacks accumulate over time and can be
enumerated by other entities in the retail industry.
However, there are still some challenging issues that could hinder the development of a
reliable retail reputation system. Firstly, the process of leaving feedbacks may reveal much
personal consumer information, which can be used to track and profile consumers [37].
Moreover, consumers may be reluctant and compelled while leaving a negative review to
24
a specific retailer in the fear of related consequences [71]. Simply leveraging pseudonyms
for rating anonymity cannot resolve this concern, which can suffer from de-anonymization
attacks [149]. Secondly, current reputation systems mainly utilize a centralized marketplace
that collects and accumulates consumer reviews. However, it has been evidenced that the
current centralized marketplace may fail to keep their promise of a desired trust level due
to the leak of private consumer information and lack of system transparency [36].
The shortcomings of current reputation systems motivate the research efforts on design-
ing a reputation system that provides strong consumer anonymity guarantees [69, 70, 37, 71]
without relying on a centralized marketplace [114, 36, 72]. Besides anonymity, reputation
systems are required to resist to various attacks (such as self-rating and Sybil attacks [150]),
which becomes more challenging in a decentralized marketplace [72]. However, existing de-
centralized solutions for reputation systems provide insufficient system transparency, which
is essential for the IIoT-enabled retail marketing due to lack of mutual trust among the
involved entities. To realize a more open and transparent reputation system, extensive re-
search efforts have been directed to the design of a blockchain-based architecture [36, 114].
In their designs, blockchain serves as an immutable ledger where the review generation
and reputation accumulation process can be publicly verified and traced. The underly-
ing consensus and incentive mechanisms of blockchain technology also contribute to the
boost of mutual trust among consumers and retailers. Although these attempts [36, 114]
have exploited blockchain technologies for building up a promising reputation system, the
proposed systems pay insufficient attention to the efficiency and scalability issues of the
blockchain technology [84]. Moreover, implementation challenges of a blockchain-based
architecture have not been well investigated.
To address the issues, we propose an Anonymous Reputation System atop a Proof-
of-Stake blockchain (ARS-PS). The proposed ARS-PS allows retailers to establish repu-
tations by accumulating feedbacks from consumers. Meanwhile, the ARS-PS ensures that
retailer reputation accumulation process is transparent to the public while providing strong
anonymity to consumers. The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows.
B We design an efficient and anonymous reputation system by leveraging a random-
izable signature [119, 37] with non-interactive zero-knowledge proof technique [127,
130]. The proposed system preserves the identity and the individual review confiden-
tiality of the consumer. Only the aggregated review statistics for retailers is revealed
to the public.
B We exploit the consensus protocol in [77] and design a blockchain-based architec-
ture to integrate the proposed anonymous reputation system. Our designs enhance
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the system transparency for review generation and reputation accumulation while
preserving the consumer anonymity and accountability at the same time.
B We explore the implementation challenges of the blockchain-based architecture: (1)
compatibility with current blockchain platforms; and (2) insufficient support for
cryptographic primitives. We develop a proof-of-concept prototype system based on
Ethereum Parity [151]. We build a testing blockchain network and the experimental
results demonstrate efficiency and feasibility of the proposed ARS-PS.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the system
model, security model, and design goals are presented. In Section 3.3, we present the
building blocks in this chapter. In Section 3.4 and Section 3.5, we propose the anonymous
reputation system and the efficient integration with a PoS blockchain. We analyze the
security of the proposed ARS-PS in Section 3.6, and evaluate its performance in Section
3.7. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.8.
3.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the system model, security model, and design goals of this
chapter.
3.2.1 System Model
In Fig. 3.1, there are three entities in our system: consumers, retailers, and an identity
management entity (IDM).
B Consumer. A consumer, uniquely identified by Ci, can make purchases from retail-
ers and later leave a numeric rating score for the retailer.
B Retailer. A retailer, uniquely identified by Rj, can sell products to consumers and
establish reputations from consumer feedbacks. Retailers also act as stakeholders
and collaboratively maintain a public leger (denoted as L) based on a PoS consensus
protocol [77].
B IDM. IDM is a government agency that is in charge of issuing and managing iden-
tities and credentials of consumers and retailers.
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Figure 3.1: Anonymous Reputation System
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At a high level, the ARS-PS works as follows. Consumers and retailers first register
themselves to IDM. Each consumer obtains an anonymous identity credential from IDM.
Afterwards, consumers can make purchases from retailers and obtain an anonymous rating
token. Later, a consumer can leave a review (a rating score) for a retailer by making a
review transaction to L and privately tie the review to a previous purchase. Finally, review
transactions for the same retailer accumulate as a numeric score in the reputation board.
Note that IDM in ARS-PS can be extended to a distributed identity management system
[152].
3.2.2 Security Model
We assume IDM to be fully trusted. This is reasonable since the behavior of IDM is a
government agency responsible for the administration of the citizens. Some consumers
and retailers can be malicious and may launch a bunch of attacks to the system such as
Sybil attacks, and whihte/bad mouthing attacks [37]. For the security of public leger L,
we borrow the assumptions from [77, 153]. In particular, the stake in the PoS consensus
protocol is associated with the reputation of retailers in the ARS-PS. We require that an
adversary cannot control the majority of the stake (reputation) in the system. Meanwhile,
we assume that a rational retailer (stakeholder) with high reputation (stake) is more willing
to maintain the correctness of the ledger L. This is reasonable since the cost for a high-
scored retailer to behave maliciously is huge [77].
3.2.3 Design Goals
Under the security assumptions, we summarize the design goals of the ARS-PS.
B Bounded Confidentiality. A consumer’s individual review statistics (rating scores)
should be kept private. Only the aggregated retailer review statistics is revealed to the
public. However, individual rating scores should have upper and lower boundaries.
Consumers cannot submit rating scores that exceed the boundaries.
B Conditional Anonymity. Obtaining a rating token or leaving a review on a public
ledger will not expose a consumer’s true identity. However, IDM should be able to
recover the true identity of an anonymous review in case of consumer misbehavior.
B Unforgeability. The anonymous identity credential and rating token cannot be forged.
Without the credential and the token, consumers cannot submit a valid review to
the public ledger.
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B Confined Unlinkability. The public cannot determine if two valid reviews for different
retailers are from the same consumer. However, the reviews are linkable if a consumer
leaves multiple reviews for the same retailer.
B Transparency. Review generation and reputation accumulation process should be
transparent and publicly verifiable to all retailers and consumers.
B Blockchain Security. The public transaction ledger should be robust and on-chain
transactions should be immutable.
3.3 Building Blocks
In this section, building blocks in this chapter are presented. We denote three cyclic groups
G1, G2, and GT with a prime order p and a Type III bilinear pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT .
g, h ∈ G1 and g̃ ∈ G2 are generators of G1,G2. H is a collision-resist hash function that
maps a string of arbitrary length to Zp. We denote u ∈R Zp as randomly choosing a
number from Zp.
3.3.1 Zero-Knowledge Proof
Zero-knowledge proof technique enables one party (prover) to prove to another party (ver-
ifier) that she knows some secret s for a public verifiable relation without exposing the
secrets. In this chapter, we use the notation [154] for proof statement in the discrete-
logarithm setting [22]. A typical example can be written as follows.
PK{(r1, r2) : Y1 = hr1gr2 ∧ Y2 = gr1}. (3.1)
r1, r2 ∈ Zp are the secrets that need to be proven and Y1, Y2, h, g ∈ G1 are the public
parameters. The above proof can be instantiated using sigma protocol with Fiat-Shamir
heuristic [127] as follows.
1. The prover chooses two random numbers k1, k2 ∈R Zp and computes commitments
T1 = h
k1gk2 and T2 = g
k1 .
2. The prover computes c = H(Y1, Y2, T1, T2) and z1 = k1 + cr1, z2 = k2 + cr2.
3. For a given proof T1, T2, z1, z2, the verifier computes c = H(Y1, Y2, T1, T2) and checks
T1
?
= Y −c1 h
z1gz2 and T2
?
= Y −c2 g




Proposed by David Pointcheval and Olivier Sanders [119], PS signature is a signature
scheme with a short signature size. The secret parameter S for the signature scheme is
x, y, where x, y ∈R Zp. The public parameters P is (g, g̃, X̃, Ỹ ), where g ∈ G1, g̃ ∈ G2,
and X̃ = g̃x, Ỹ = g̃y. PS signature can be utilized to sign on committed messages, and
the signature of the committed message is randomizable. In the following, two detailed
techniques that are used to construct anonymous identity credentials and rating tokens are
presented.
Sign on Committed Messages
We define a function SigCom(T,P ,S, u) that takes as input the commitment T = gm of
a message m ∈ Zp, public/secret parameters P/S, and a random number u ∈R Zp. The
function outputs σ as the PS signature of the message m as follows.
σ = (σ1, σ2) = (g
u, (gx · T y)u). (3.2)
Prove Knowledge of a Signature
Suppose that we have a signature tuple σ = (σ1, σ2) of a message m. The prover first
chooses t ∈R Zp to randomize the signature as (σ′1, σ′2) = (σt1, σt2). Then, the prover needs
to prove that:
PK{(m,σ) : σ is a PS signature on m}. (3.3)
In specific, the prover chooses k ∈R Zp and computes R = e(σ′1, Ỹ )k. The prover then
obtains a random challenge c ∈ Zp using Fiat-Shamir heuristic and computes s = k+ c ·m.
Given (σ′1, σ
′
2, c, s), a verifier can compute R
′ = (e(σ′−11 , X̃)e(σ
′
2, g̃))
−ce(σ′s1 , Ỹ ) and checks
if the random challenge c is correctly computed.
3.3.3 Bulletproof System
Bulletproof [130] is an efficient zero-knowledge proof system for range proof on committed
values with compact proof size. An instance of bulletproof can be written as follows.
PK{(a, r) : Y = hrga ∧ a ∈ [0, 2n]}. (3.4)
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Y = hrga is a Pedersen commitment of the integer a ∈ Zp using randomness r. The above
proof will convince the verifier that the secret in the commitment Y lies in the range [0, 2n].
Bulletproof can be instantiated in the discrete logarithm setting and made non-interactive
with Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We refer the readers to [130] for the detailed construction.
3.3.4 Ouroboros - A PoS Blockchain
Blockchain is a public ledger maintained by a peer-to-peer network that provides immutable
and transparent list of transaction records [155]. It contains an increasing list of blocks
of transactions shared by network peers. Network peers rely on consensus protocols to
reach consistency on the shared public ledger. In this chapter, a state-of-art Proof-of-
Stake (PoS) based blockchain Ouroboros [77] is adopted due to its efficiency and rigorous
security guarantees. In the following, we summarize the concepts and design principles of
Ouroboros [77].
B Stakeholder. A stakeholder is the miner in Ouroboros. Each stakeholder is assigned
with a certain amount of stake and the amount of stake can change overtime.
B Epoch/Slot. An epoch is a set of equal time slots. The Ouroboros assumes global
clock is divided into discrete epochs and all the stakeholders maintain a roughly
synchronized clock.
B Users. Users are the participants of the blockchain network. Users can make trans-
actions to transfer crypto currencies and change the state of the public ledger.
B Block/Ledger. A block is a collection of transactions. A sequence of blocks constitutes
a leger.
In Ouroboros, a stateholder is elected as the slot leader for each time slot. The role of the
slot leader is to collect transactions and issue only one block for the time slot. The core
of the Ouroboros is a leader selection function that elects the slot leader proportionally to
stakeholder’s stake. That is, the more stake a stakeholder has, the more likely she will be
elected as a slot leader.
3.4 Anonymous Reputation System
In this section, we propose an anonymous reputation system based on PS-signature [119],
Bulletproof system [130] and non-interactive zero-knowledge proof technique. We assume
31
secure and authenticated channels are established among entities.
3.4.1 System Setup
Given λ as the system security parameter, IDM chooses a set of bilinear groups G1,G2,GT
with a prime order p and an asymmetric bilinear pairing e [119]. H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp denotes
a hash function. IDM chooses non-identical generators g1, g2 ∈ G1 and g̃ ∈ G2. IDM
randomly chooses S = (x, y) ∈R Z2p to compute the system public key X̃ = g̃x, Ỹ = g̃y.
Finally, IDM sets the system public parameter P as follows:
P =
{




A consumer Ci first registers herself at IDM using her true identity. After that, Ci interacts
with IDM to obtain an anonymous identity credential as follows.
1. Ci chooses a secret csi ∈R Zp and computes (Ti,1, Ti,2) = (gcsi1 , Ỹ csi). Then, Ci
generates πcsi , a zero-knowledge proof of csi as follows.
PK{(csi) : Ti,1 = gcsi1 ∧ Ti,2 = Ỹ csi}. (3.6)
Ci sends (Ti,1, Ti,2, πcsi) to IDM.
2. IDM first checks the validity of πcsi and e(Ti,1, Ỹ )
?
= e(g1, Ti,2). If either of the
equations does not hold, IDM aborts. Otherwise, IDM chooses u ∈R Zp and computes
a PS signature on the committed message Ti,1 for consumer Ci as follows.
σi = SigCom(Ti,1,P ,S, u)









IDM stores (Ci, Ti,1, Ti,2, σi) and sends σi to Ci.




= e(σi,2, g̃). (3.8)
If the equation holds, Ci stores (csi, σi) as her anonymous identity credential.
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3.4.3 Retailer Registration
Retailers register themselves at IDM as follows.
1. A retailer Rj chooses g̃j ∈R G2, xj, yj, skj ∈R Z3p, and computes X̃j = g̃
xj
j , Ỹj =
g̃
yj
j , pkj = g
skj
2 . The secret parameter of Rj is Sj = (xj, yj, skj), and the public
parameter is Pj = (g̃j, X̃j, Ỹj, pkj).
2. Then, Rj generates a proof πRj as follows.
PK
{
(xj, yj, skj) : X̃j = g̃
xj
j ∧ Ỹj = g̃
yj





Rj sends its public key Pj and πRj to IDM.
3. IDM checks the validity of proof πRj . IDM aborts when the proof is invalid. Other-
wise, IDM stores (Rj,Pj).
3.4.4 Rating Token Generation
Consumers can make purchases from retailers via anonymous payment channels, such as
zerocash [96]. After making a purchase from Rj, Ci can obtain an anonymous rating token
as follows.
1. Ci chooses gi,j ∈R G1 and t ∈R Zp to compute (σ′i,1, σ′i,2) = (σti,1, σti,2), Y = g
−csi
i,j




σi is a PS signature on csi ∧
Y = g−csii,j
 . (3.10)
2. In specific, Ci chooses k ∈R Zp and computes:
R = e(σ′i,1, Ỹ )
k = e(σi,1, Ỹ )
kt,
T = gki,j,
c = H(σ′i,1, σ′i,2, R, Y, T, gi,j),
s = k + c · csi.
(3.11)
The proof is the combination of the general pre-image zero-knowledge technique with
the proof-of-knowledge of signature technique by re-using the response s. Ci sends
(σ′i,1, σ
′
i,2, Y, gi,j, c, s) to Rj.
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3. Rj computes R







T ′ = Y cgsi,j,
c
?
= H(σ′i,1, σ′i,2, R′, Y, T ′, gi,j).
(3.12)
If the equation holds, Rj will generate an anonymous rating token σi,j for Ci using
xj, yj:
σi,j = SigCom(Y,Pj,Sj, u′)








where u′ ∈R Zp. Rj sends the anonymous rating token σi,j to Ci via a secure channel.





= e(σi,j,2, g̃j). (3.14)
If the equation holds, Ci stores σi,j as her rating token for retailer Rj.
3.4.5 Anonymous Review Generation and Verification
IDM chooses a set of retailers to form a committee LC . A consumer Ci can leave a rating
score for the retailer Rj using the rating token σi,j and the identity credential σi as follows.
1. Ci chooses a rating score si,j, where si,j ∈ Zp can be an integer in [1, 10]. Ci obtains
the public keys pkj of all the committee members and computes pkC =
∏
Rj∈LC pkj.
Ci chooses r ∈R Zp and encrypts si,j as follows.


















2 ∧ si,j ∈ [1, 10]
}
. (3.16)
The above proof can be instantiated via sigma protocol and bulletproof system.
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2. Ci chooses random numbers r1, r2 ∈ Zp and computes:
β1 = σ
r1
i,1, β2 = σ
r1









Ci needs to prove the knowledge of a valid rating token and an identity credential by
constructing the proof as follows.
PK

(csi, σi, σi,j) :





3. In specific, Ci chooses a random number kep ∈ Zp and computes:
α1 = e(β1, Ỹ )





ch = H(β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, α1, α2, α3, Rj, ri,j, πi,j),
si = kep + ch · csi.
(3.19)
Ci sets σ = (β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, ch, si) and sends the anonymous review (σ, ri,j, πi,j, Rj)
to the committee members.
4. Upon receiving the ratings from Ci, the committee members check the validity of the
anonymous review. The committee members first compute the following equations
using system public parameters P and retailer Rj’s public key Pj.














The committee members check the validity of proof πi,j as specified in [130] and
whether ch
?
= H(β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, α′1, α′2, α′3, Rj, ri,j, πi,j). If both of the conditions
hold, the committee members accept the anonymous review.
3.4.6 Review Aggregation
Committee members aggregate the valid encrypted rating scores for each retailer. For




ri,j,2) for all the
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valid encrypted rating scores ri,j. For retailer Rj, a committee member Cm computes a
partial decryption token pj,m = s
skm
j,2 , where skm is the secret key of Cm. The committee
member constructs a proof πj,m that the partial decryption token is correctly constructed
as follows.
PK{(skm) : pj,m = sskmj,2 ∧ pkm = g
skm
2 }. (3.21)








It should be noted that the final aggregated rating score
∑
si,j is at the exponent of g2.
All retailers and consumers can efficiently pre-compute a table that contains gl2, where l
can range from 0 to a few thousands.
3.4.7 Linking and Tracing
For all the valid reviews, committee members will check if there exist the same β5. If
committee members find the same β5 from different reviews, it indicates that a consumer
submitted multiple reviews for the same purchase. The committee members will report
the anonymous review of the misbehaving consumer to IDM. To recover the true identity
of the misbehaving consumer, IDM checks the following equation for each (Ti,1, Ti,2) stored
in its storage:
e(β2, g̃) · e(β1, X̃)−1
?
= e(β1, Ti,2). (3.23)
IDM publishes Ti,1 and Ti,2 that matches the above equation as the misbehaving consumer.
In this section, we propose a reputation system that enables consumers privately make
purchases and leave reviews. In the next section, we will present the details on imple-
menting the proposed system on a PoS blockchain to improve system transparency and
reliability.
3.5 Anonymous Reputation System atop PoS Blockchain
In this section, we integrate our anonymous reputation system atop a PoS blockchain -
Ouroboros [77]. The operations proposed in the previous section 3.4 are classified into
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two categories: on-chain and off-chain operations. The off-chain operations include con-
sumer/retailer registration and rating token generation that require interactions between
IDM, retailers, and consumers via secure channels.
Review generation, verification, and aggregation are on-chain operations that happen
over a public ledger L. We adopt a hybrid blockchain model in the ARS-PS. Retailers act
as stakeholders based on the PoS protocol in Ouroboros with their reputations associated
with the stake. Retailers need to obtain permissions from the IDM before they can serve
as stakeholders. Consumers act as blockchain users who can freely join the blockchain
network. Consumers can leave reviews and enumerate accumulated retailers’ reputation
scores by making different types of transactions to the ledger. The reasons that we adopt
Ouroboros are threefold.
B A PoS blockchain is more suitable for constructing a consortium network.
B A PoS blockchain offers qualitative efficiency and scalability compared with a PoW
blockchain.
B Committee member management in the ARS-PS can be realized via the consensus
protocol in [77].
The blockchain-based anonymous reputation system consists of the following steps. Nota-
tions from Section 3.5 are re-used.
3.5.1 Genesis Block Generation
IDM runs the System Setup of Section 3.5, generates and publishes the system param-
eters P . Consumers and retailers can obtain P via secure channels, such as TLS. IDM
also defines TA as the size of the anonymity set, which indicates the privacy level of the
system. Retailers interact with the IDM to register their public keys Pj. IDM creates
a global reputation board B that contains the global reputation scores RSj for each re-
tailer. Consumers register themselves at IDM to obtain anonymous identity credentials σi.
Both retailers and consumers can join the blockchain network to obtain their blockchain
accounts with a public/private key pair to sign on the transactions. Retailer blockchain
account information is publicly associated with their identities, while consumer blockchain
accounts remain anonymous.
IDM sets the global clock of the system and divides the clock into epochs of equal time
slots. Each epoch is divided into three stages: Accumulation, Aggregation and Revelation.
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The number of time slots for each stage is K1,K2,K3, respectively. At the beginning of
each epoch, IDM runs a committee selection function [77] to select a committee of retailers
with high reputation scores, which is responsible for the slot leader selection and review
revelation process. Afterwards, IDM generates a genesis block of the ledger L consisting
of system parameters P , retailer parameters Pj, retailers blockchain account information,
and the list of committee members LC in this epoch. Committee members run a leader
selection function [77] to select slot leaders for time slots in this epoch.
3.5.2 Review Accumulation
For each registered retailer Rj, IDM creates a review smart contract SCj. The smart
contract SCj records the reviews for the retailer Rj. In particular, the contract SCj has two
functions Update and GetReview. The Update function takes into the anonymous reviews
from consumers. The anonymous reviews can later be accessed by the GetReview function.
In specific, consumer Ci can make purchases from retailer Rj in an off-chain manner and
obtain a valid rating token σi,j. Ci can generate an anonymous review transaction Tr
including the anonymous review (σ, ri,j, πi,j, Rj) to the smart contract SCj by calling the
Update function. The smart contract SCj records the anonymous review in its storage for
future reputation aggregation and revelation.
3.5.3 Review Aggregation
In the Aggregation stage, each slot leader is responsible for the review aggregation task of
1/K2 of overall retailers. Slot leaders aggregate the encrypted reviews for each retailer in
the following steps.
B A slot leader queries the current state of contracts SCj in her management scope.
The slot leader will report double-reviews for the same retailer to the IDM to recover
the true identity of the misbehaving consumer.
B For retailer Rj, the slot leader checks the number of valid received reviews. If the
number exceeds TA, the slot leader aggregates the valid encrypted rating scores to
obtain an aggregated rating score sj.
B The slot leader constructs a reveal smart contract R. The contract R includes the
aggregated rating scores for retailers in her management scope with a counter CRj
that records the number of reviews received for the retailer. The reveal contract also
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provides a function UpdateToken to receive partial decryption tokens from committee
members.
After all the slot leaders in this stage publish the R contracts, the system proceeds to the
final Revelation stage.
3.5.4 Review Revelation
In the Revelation stage, committee members first check the reveal contracts R generated
from the previous stage. For the aggregated rating scores, committee members update
their partial decryption tokens to the reveal contracts using the UpdateToken function.
After obtaining all the partial decryption tokens for the reveal contracts, IDM verifies
the correctness of the partial decryption tokens and decrypts the aggregated scores using
Equation 3.22. Finally, IDM updates the reputation scores in the global reputation board
for retailers.
3.5.5 Epoch Update
For the next epoch, retailers interact with IDM to generate a new set of retailer public keys
Pj for each retailer Rj. IDM runs the committee selection function for the new epoch. New
committee members then run the leader selection function for this epoch according to the
updated global reputation scores. For the encrypted reviews that are not aggregated in the
previous epoch, consumers generate new review transactions with the updated committee
encryption parameters.
3.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we give the security analysis of the proposed ARS-PS based on the design
goals.
3.6.1 Bounded Confidentiality
Consumers encrypt their rating scores with committee members’ public keys. Committee
members will check the validity of the reveal contracts and only publish their partial
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decryption tokens for the valid aggregated rating scores. That is, an adversary can obtain
the individual review statistics only if he can solve the DDH problem in G1 [156] or he can
control the whole committee members to recover the decryption key. At the same time,
consumers need to prove that the encrypted rating scores lie in a correct range. Due to
the Soundness and Completeness property of Bulletproof [130], the verifier will accept the
range proof if it is correctly constructed. That is, the bounded confidentiality is preserved
in our system.
3.6.2 Conditional Anonymity
The consumer Ci first registers herself at IDM to obtain an anonymous identity credential
σi. To obtain an anonymous rating token, consumer Ci chooses a random generator gi,j for
each purchase and proves to the retailer that the committed message Y = g−csii,j contains the
same consumer secret with the identity token in a zero-knowledge manner. Then, retailers
can sign on the committed message Y = g−csii,j . When leaving an anonymous review, Ci
needs to prove the knowledge of a valid rating token and an anonymous identity credential
using the sigma protocol [127]. Thus, the anonymity of obtaining a rating token and leaving
a review can be reduced to the Zero-knowledge property of the underlying sigma protocol
in the discrete logarithm setting. When a consumer misbehavior is detected, slot leaders
report the anonymous reviews to IDM to recover the identity of the consumer. Retailers
cannot recover the identity of a consumer since consumers do not generate the Ỹ csij when
obtaining the rating token. That is, conditional anonymity is preserved in the ARS-PS.
3.6.3 Unforgeability
To generate the anonymous identity credential, IDM needs to sign on the committed mes-
sage gcsi1 using PS signature. Similarly, the retailer needs to sign on the committed message
gcsii,j to generate a rating token for consumer Ci. That is, the unforgeability of the iden-
tity credential and rating token can be reduced to the unforgeability of the PS signature
[119], which can be further reduced to q-MSDH-1 assumption in the non-interactive
setting [119]. To generate the anonymous review σ and πi,j, the consumer needs to prove
the knowledge of an identity credential and a rating token at the same time. Thus, the




The unlinkability requires that retailers and consumers cannot determine if two reviews
are from the same consumer. This property comes from two folds. First, a consumer
can choose different random generators to require a rating token. Second, the consumer
can further randomize the rating token by choosing a random number r2 when generating
an anonymous review and prove the knowledge of consumer secret in a zero-knowledge
manner. That is, the unlinkability can be reduced to the security of underlying sigma
protocol. When generating a review, Ci needs to construct β5 and prove to the public
that β5 contains the same secret csi with β1, β2, β3, β4. If Ci leaves multiple reviews for the
same retailer, the β5 in the anonymous review is publicly identical. The combination of
conditional anonymity and confined unlinkability helps the system mitigate Sybil attacks.
3.6.5 Transparency
The review accumulation, aggregation and revelation are implemented by the review and
reveal contracts on the public ledger. Consumers can make review transactions to change
or query the state of the contracts. Since the transactions and ledger state changes are
open to the public’s view, transparency of reputation system is guaranteed [107].
3.6.6 Blockchain Security
As a public transaction ledger, the blockchain security is formally defined as Persistence
and Liveness [77]. Specifically, we borrow the definitions from [77]. Persistence preserves
the stability of the public ledger. Liveness means that a valid transaction is guaranteed
to be included in the ledger after a certain time. If the adversary cannot control the most
stakes in the system, Ouroboros is proven to achieve the above properties [77]. The ledger is
maintained by registered retailers and the retailer’s reputation in our system is associated
with the stake in the PoS consensus protocol of Ouroboros. A retailer with a higher
reputation score is less likely to behave distrustfully since the cost for the misbehavior is
expensive. As a result, the public transaction ledger is robust in the ARS-PS. We then
discuss the security of the review and reveal contracts.
In the Accumulation stage, consumers make transactions to the review contracts. Based
on the ledger robustness, the transactions will finally be confirmed after certain number
of slots with a high probability. Prorogation delays could happen such that some reviews
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may not be included on the ledger in this epoch. In this case, consumers can update their
reviews in the next epoch.
In the Aggregation phase, slot leaders verify the correctness of the reviews and aggregate
the encrypted rating scores. That is, the security in this stage (i.e. the correctness of the
aggregated rating scores) depends highly on the trustworthiness of the slot leaders. If a slot
leader does not fulfill his task (e.g. aggregate incorrect reviews or purposely exclude some
reviews), his misbehavior may not be discovered immediately. However, since the historical
reviews and aggregated rating scores are open to the public, anyone in the system can check
the correctness in the future and makes a complaint if the misbehavior of a slot leader is
detected. By properly setting the punishment for misbehaving slot leaders, a rationale slot
leader is motivated to correctly fulfill the task. Moreover, blockchain accounts of consumers
remain anonymous in the ARS-PS. A malicious consumer may generate a large number of
invalid reviews to use up the slot leader’s computational capacities. To prevent this attack,
the review contracts can require consumers to deposit currencies to the contract and only
returns the currencies to the consumer when the review is verified. Secure and anonymous
payment channels (such as zerocash [96]) can be utilized to preserve consumer anonymity
and unlinkability in this process.
In the Revelation stage, committee members verify the correctness of reveal contracts
and update their partial decryption tokens to the reveal contract. The correctness of the
tokens is ensured by the zero-knowledge proof πj,m. The public cannot decrypt the ag-
gregated rating scores unless all the committee members have successfully submitted their
tokens to the ledger. Compared with communication overhead in the Accumulation stage,
only finite transactions are required in this stage. To mitigate the impact of communi-
cation delay among committee members, we can set a larger number of K3 to ensure the
ledger robustness at this stage. For the committee member that fail to submit the token,
IDM can directly contact the committee member. We can also implement a threshold
encryption scheme [157] to improve system robustness.
3.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed ARS-PS. We first compare
the ARS-PS with existing schemes in terms of functionalities. Then, we present a proof-of-
concept implementation based on Parity Ethereum, and demonstrate the implementation
feasibility. Finally, we discuss the scalability of the ARS-PS.
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3.7.1 Functionality
Table 3.1: Overview of Functionalities












√ √ √ √
In Table 3.1, we summarize the recent advances in reputation systems in terms of
architectures and desired functionalities. C-Anonymity means conditional anonymity, B-
Confidentiality means bounded confidentiality and C-Unlinkability means confined unlink-
ability. Compared with a centralized architecture [37], a decentralized architecture [69, 71]
is preferred for its advantage in eliminating a single trusted marketplace. Blockchain-based
solutions [114, 36] and the ARS-PS further increase system transparency. As we discussed
in the security analysis section, versatile functionalities are achieved in the ARS-PS by
integrating a PoS blockchain with a set of cryptographic primitives.
3.7.2 Implementation Overview
We present a proof-of-concept implementation of the ARS-PS as shown in Fig. 3.2. We
simulate IDM, consumer, and retailer with JAVA clients on a laptop with 2.40 GHz Intel
Core i5 processors and 8 GB memory. We implement an MNT curve with an embedding
degree 6 based on Java Pairing based Cryptography (JPBC) [158]. We instantiate Bullet-
proof system with a range of 3 bit with the implementation of the linear size arguments.
We set up a testing Ethereum Proof of Authority (PoA) blockchain network [159]. In
particular, two kinds of Parity nodes are implemented in Parity PoA network.
B Authority nodes serve as retailers that can be selected as slot leaders to validate
transactions and issue blocks.
B User nodes serve as consumers that can make anonymous review transactions to the
blockchain.
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Figure 3.2: Implementation Overview
For illustrative purposes, a few authority nodes and user nodes are deployed in our ex-
periments. Slot leaders are statically specified and written as configurations in the chain
specification file. We increase the block gas limit in our testing network for storing the
reviews. JAVA clients communicate with the associated Parity nodes via web3j [160] to
send transactions and interact with smart contracts. Moreover, we encode the public pa-
rameters of the system and authority nodes into Java clients. A review smart contract
written in Solidity [161] is deployed via Parity UI, that provides an Update function and a
GetReview function.
We evaluate the system efficiency in terms of on-chain and off-chain performance. On-
chain operations denote the review transaction generation/verification. Off-chain opera-
tions denote the registration and token generation phases.
3.7.3 Off-chain Performance
We evaluate the off-chain performance including consumer/retailer registration, rating to-
ken generation among entities. In Table 3.2, experimental results show that the computa-
tion incurs a few milliseconds.
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Table 3.2: Off-chain Overhead
Operations Involved Entities Time (ms)
Consumer Registration Consumer/IDM 487
Retailer Registration Retailer/IDM 263
Rating Token Generation Consumer/Retailer 259
3.7.4 On-chain Performance
We simulate an epoch of the ARS-PS. In particular, consumers with rating tokens and
identity credentials leave anonymous reviews by calling the Update function in the review
contract. Then, the slot leader retrieves all the reviews from the review contract and
verifies the correctness of the proofs. The slot leader creates another reveal contract R
that aggregates the encrypted rating scores of valid reviews and receives partial decryption
tokens from committee members.
We move the on-chain proof verifications to be conducted by the slot leader out of the
EVM. In Table 3.3, we show the computational cost of generating and verifying an anony-
mous review. We further compare the ARS-PS with another blockchain-based literature
that is based on ring signature [36] for review generation/verification. A ring-signature
based method [36] requires purchase transactions to be also deployed on the public ledger.
Consumers collect a set of public keys of previous purchase transactions (anonymity set
TA) to generate/verify the anonymous reviews, which results in linearly increasing com-
putational cost as shown in Fig. 3.3(a) and 3.3(b). The review generation/verification
may consume a few hundred milliseconds in the ARS-PS. The reasons are twofold: (1)
The proof σ consists of an identity proof and rating token proof to achieve conditional
anonymity, which results in a double proof of knowledge of PS signature; and (2) paring
operations over an MNT curve are expensive in the implemented JPBC library without
PBC wrapper.
Table 3.3: Review Generation/Verification
Rating Score Proof σ Proof πi,j
Generation (ms) 15 183 63
Verification (ms) N/A 347 110
Size (Bytes) 104 306 565
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Figure 3.3: Review Computation Cost
3.7.5 Scalability Discussions
In the following, we discuss the system scalability for different stages in one epoch. We
define NC as the number of committee members for the epoch.
Accumulation Stage
In our testing PoA blockchain with optimal network conditions, a consumer that calls
the Update function will have her review transaction included in the ledger within a few
blocks. In real-world implementations [77], the communication delays between consumers
and slot leaders may lead to the exclusion of a certain transaction in the epoch. To mitigate
this issue, we can increase the number of slots K1 in this stage and the number of peer
connections for the consumer Parity node.
Aggregation Stage
Slot leaders in this stage verify and aggregate the anonymous reviews. The performance is
mainly affected by two factors: the number of time slots K2 and the size of the anonymity
set TA. A larger K2 reduces the individual computation overhead for slot leaders while
increasing the overall epoch time. The quantity of TA indicates privacy guarantees for con-
sumers. However, a larger TA could also increase the probability that insufficient number of
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reviews are received for aggregation in this epoch, which requires consumers to regenerate
the reviews in the next epoch.
Revelation Stage
Committee members upload their partial decryption tokens to the reveal contract. The
total number of transactions in this stage is NC ∗K2. IDM can choose different NC for the
trade-off between system security strength and efficiency. To further improve the reveal
efficiency and prevent decryption failure in case that a committee member does not update
her decryption token, a threshold ElGamal encryption system can be adopted [157]. We
can also partition the committee into different subgroups to separately manage the review
decryption key.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have investigated the privacy and transparency issues in current rep-
utation systems for the IIoT-enabled retail marketing. We have developed an anonymous
reputation system that provides a high privacy guarantees for consumers, which can also
be efficiently and securely integrated with a PoS blockchain. We have implemented a
proof-of-concept prototype system based on Ethereum and the experimental results have





Vehicular Local Advertising with
Practical Blockchain Designs
4.1 Background
Vehicular local advertising is a prevalent advertising strategy, that allows roadside re-
tailers (e.g. restaurants or retail stores) to promote targeted advertisements (ads) to
nearby vehicular users of related interests. Vehicular users with Global Positioning System
(GPS)-enabled devices (e.g. mobile phones) can receive timely and location-aware ads [162]
through various vehicular communication channels [163, 164]. For example, vehicular users
can find restaurants near their current locations from Google Map, or receive coupons and
flyers from Facebook when they drive in a shopping center, which greatly increases their
travel efficiency and experience. At the same time, vehicular local advertising also boosts
in-store visits and promotes business for roadside retailers. According to statistics [165],
an average of 80 percent of local searches convert and 28 percent of local searches lead to
an in-store purchase. Therefore, vehicular local advertising is deemed as one of the most
promising applications in intelligent transportation systems and has attracted extensive
research and practice efforts.
In the vehicular local advertising, retailers rely on advertising brokers to manage their
ad disseminations. The third-party advertising model has been prevalent due to the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) It is cost-prohibitive for retailers to manage their advertising network,
especially for small-business owners without sufficient IT and marketing expertise. (2)
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Location Text Description
Vehicular User Ad Broker
Activity Spots
Location Text Description
Spatial Entity Ad Broker
Figure 4.1: Vehicular Local Advertising
Ad brokers can provide retailers with more effective ad dissemination services from their
huge user base and extraordinary computing platforms. In the literature, the ad dissemi-
nation process of the vehicular local advertising can be modeled as spatial keyword query
[166, 167, 168], that considers both the spatial description (e.g., the retailer location and
vehicle trajectory information) and textual description (e.g., retailer/user-specified key-
words). In Fig. 4.1, retailers can specify their locations and a textual description of their
business. Retailers then update the location and textual descriptions to the ad broker, e.g.,
Google, that can send advertisements to vehicular users. Vehicular users can find nearby
activity spots by sending a location with textual descriptions of their interests to the ad
broker.
The vehicular local advertising system has raised concerns and controversies recently
on the lack of system transparency and accountability [33, 55]. Transparency requires the
public visibility of the spatial keyword query process, which answers why a vehicular user
receives the advertisements of specific spatial entities. It could result in the increasing pop-
ularity of ad blockers [55] at the vehicular users if without proper transparency guarantees.
Accountability refers to two progressive meanings [100]. The first is the public detection of
any breach of spatial keyword query protocols, such as the detection of ad-fraud attacks
[34]. The second is the enforcement of obligations on the misbehaving advertisers or the ad
broker. For example, a retailer that sends ads with the discrimination or misinformation
should be suspended from the advertising service. While the ad broker is working towards
the increase of system transparency and accountability, it is still far from sufficient in the
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view of the public [33, 42].
The emerging blockchain technology [81] promises to serve as a public infrastructure
to enhance the current vehicular local advertising system [30, 169]. Essentially, a (public)
blockchain is a secure and distributed database, that is maintained by an open and peer-
to-peer network with mutually distrusted nodes. As a result, it is tempting to migrate the
vehicular local advertising system onto the blockchain, such that the spatial keyword query
process can be open and verifiable to the public. However, the design and implementation
of a blockchain-based vehicular local advertising system faces non-trivial obstacles in terms
of the execution efficiency of the spatial keyword query. First, the large number of spatial
objects with location and keyword information will result in a large-scale spatial keyword
database. Second, the on-chain implementation cost in terms of the storage and comput-
ing is prohibitively expensive, since all blockchain nodes must maintain a local copy and
verify the correctness of each transaction. As a result, a strawman solution that stores
the large-scale spatial keyword database and executes the spatial keyword query on the
blockchain is at the doubt of real-world practices. This motivates the main objective of
this work: to take advantage of the principles of the blockchain technology for solving a
real-world application with the practical designs. In particular, we aim at practical designs
and implementations of a large-scale vehicular local advertising system that realizes the
transparency and accountability promises of the blockchain technology.
In this chapter, we exploit the tamper-proof and open nature of the blockchain technol-
ogy and design a blockchain-based Transparent and Accountable Vehicular Local Advertising
system (TAVLA). From the state-of-the-art cryptographic building blocks, including the
verifiable computation (VC) and spatial indexing techniques, TAVLA achieves the verifi-
able spatial keyword query process for the vehicular local advertising. Verifiable means
that the spatial keyword query process is transparent to the public and any breach of
spatial keyword query protocols can be effectively detected. Moreover, we address the
scalability and efficiency issue of the blockchain-based advertising system with two design
strategies, digest-and-verify and divide-then-assemble. The contributions of this chapter
are as follows:
B We develop a verifiable spatial keyword query scheme with a cryptographic query
index, SKD-tree, that prunes the spatial keyword search space. Moreover, we con-
struct a TAVLA smart contract, that realizes the SKD-tree on Ethereum and ensures
sufficient public transparency and accountability of the spatial keyword query pro-
cess.
B We introduce two design strategies for a practical blockchain-based vehicular local
advertising system: digest-and-verify and divide-then-assemble. The large-scale spa-
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tial keyword database is digested and updated onto the blockchain with succinct
cryptographic authenticators. The verifiable spatial keyword query scheme is then
realized via modular executions of two off-chain verifiable functions. The results are
assembled and verified in the TAVLA smart contract using the authenticators with
limited on-chain storage and computation overheads.
B We conduct thorough security analysis to demonstrate that TAVLA achieves Au-
diting Security in terms of integrate, correct, transparent and accountable spatial
keyword queries. We conduct experiments with the Pinocchio VC framework, which
demonstrates that TAVLA is practical for implementations.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2, we revisit the state-of-the-
art spatial keyword query technique on road networks. Following definitions in Section 4.2,
we formulate the system model of TAVLA with formal security model and design goals in
Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we summarize the building blocks of TAVLA, including spatial
indexing, verifiable computation, and smart contract techniques. In Section 4.5, we propose
TAVLA in terms of an off-chain spatial keyword query scheme and an on-chain advertising
contract. We present the security analysis and performance evaluation in Section 4.6 and
4.7, respectively. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 4.8.
4.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we revisit the state-of-the-art non-verifiable spatial keyword query tech-
nique. First, we introduce the vector space-based probabilistic topic model (Definition 1).
Second, we formalize the definitions of spatial objects (Definition 2) and spatial keyword
queries (Definition 3).
Definition 1. Probabilistic topic model [170] is a natural language processing
mechanism that translates a textual description W of a spatial object o to a topic
description T . For example, a textual description for a restaurant can be ‘sea food’,
‘restaurant’ and ‘hot beverages’. A topic description is a collection of the topic distri-
butions of W . In particular, T is an m-dimension vector. Each item T [z] represents a
relevance score of a topic z (intended activity) from an m-dimension topic dictionary
DT .
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Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model [171] is adopted to translate the textual de-
scription W to a topic description T in the following equation:
T [z] =
Nw + ε
|W |+ |DT | × ε
(4.1)
Nw represents the number of keywords in W that belong to the topic z. |W |, |DT | is the
size of the keyword, topic dictionary. ε is the symmetric Dirichlet prior [167]. In Table 4.1,
we show an illustrative example for topic descriptions of 50 spatial entities. Topics from
DT include ‘Game’, ‘Gym’, et al.. We can see that a spatial entity can relate to multiple
topics (activities). A higher T [z] indicates a larger relevance score of the intended activity
z.
To measure the distance between two topic descriptions T and T ′, we adopt the Eu-
clidean distance metrics as follows:
Dist(T, T ′) =
√√√√ m∑
z=1
(T [z]− T ′[z])2 (4.2)
Table 4.1: An illustrative example of topic descriptions
Game Gym ... Movie Shop
T1 0.67 0.03 ... 0.03 0.03
T2 0.03 0.03 ... 0.91 0.03
... ... ... ... ... ...
T50 0.04 0.04 ... 0.75 0.04
Definition 2. A spatial object [168, 167] oi for a spatial entity Ei is formally
represented as:
oi = (Li, Ti)
Li = (xi, yi) is a two-dimension coordinate representation. Ti is the topic description
of Ei.
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Definition 3. A spatial keyword query function FS takes into O = (o1, o2, ..., on)
and a spatial keyword query Q = (Lq, Tq, k, λ). It outputs top-k spatial objects RT
from O that have the most higher relevance scores to the spatial keyword query Q.
FS(O, Q)→ RT
Lq = (xq, yq) is a location of interest. Tq is the topic description of intended activities.
λ is a preference ratio indicates the importance of the spatial proximity, while 1 − λ
indicates the importance of the topic prolixity. k is the number of spatial entities that will




(L.x− L′.x)2 + (L.y − L′.y)2 (4.3)
Finally, the relevance score RS between a query Q and a spatial object oi = (Li, Ti) is
defined in Eq. 4.4 [168, 167], where η is the normalization factor to convert the point
distance to a range of (0,1).
RS(Q, oi) = λ×Dist(Lq, Li)/η + (1− λ)×Dist(Tq, Ti) (4.4)
4.3 Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the system model, security model, and design goals of TAVLA.
4.3.1 System Model
The system model of TAVLA is derived from the commercial model of the vehicular lo-
cal advertising, such as local recommendation or trajectory plan services in the Google
map. The main difference is that TAVLA introduces the blockchain as a public auditing
infrastructure to improve the transparency and enforce accountability for the advertising
system. In Fig. 4.2, we abstract four parties in TAVLA as spatial entity, vehicular user,
ad broker, and the blockchain.
B A spatial entity is a retailer on a road network, such as a restaurant or a coffee store.
The spatial entity would like to promote their business by sending location-aware
[172] ads to vehicular users of related interests.
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B Vehicular users refer to moving vehicles on the roads with GPS-based devices. They
would like to find spatial entities within a specific geographical area for various ac-
tivities such as food, movie, gas and shopping.
B The ad broker (such as Google Ads [17]) provides third-party ad dissemination ser-
vices for spatial entities. It is responsible for running spatial keyword queries and
disseminating location-aware ads to targeted vehicular users.
B The blockchain in TAVLA is a public and appended-only ledger, which supports
secure and verifiable transactions among mutually distrustful peer nodes. A smart
contract, that specifies involved parties, terms, and obligations, can be deployed on
the blockchain.
In TAVLA, spatial entities carefully specify spatial objects with their locations and
topic descriptions, and send the objects to the ad broker. The ad broker constructs a
spatial keyword database and uploads the cryptographic authenticators of the database
onto the blockchain. Vehicular users construct the spatial keyword query Q and send it to
an advertising contract on the blockchain. The ad broker retrieves spatial keyword queries
from the contract, executes the queries over its local spatial keyword database, and sends
back results (most relevant spatial entities) to the contract with correctness proof. The
advertising contract verifies the correctness of the results and notifies the public if any
verification fails. Finally, vehicular users retrieve the correct results from the advertising
contract.
In TAVLA, the advertising smart contract is running on the Ethereum blockchain. It
is critical to motivate the Ethereum miners to join the local advertising process. In the
local advertising system, spatial entities will pay the ad broker for managing keywords and
delivering ads to related vehicular users, which can be partially directed to the blockchain
miners as reward for managing the advertising smart contract.
4.3.2 Security Model
The ad broker and spatial entities are profit-driven commercial organizations. (1) Spa-
tial entities carefully choose their locations and topic descriptions to enjoy effective ad
dissemination services and attract more in-store visits. (2) Due to lack of advertising
transparency and profit consideration, the ad broker may deviate from the spatial keyword
query function in Definition 3 and promote irrelevant or misleading ads to vehicular users
[33]. Vehicular users accept the ad dissemination results if they are correctly generated.
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Figure 4.2: System Model
However, vehicular users may reject the results if there is lack of advertising transparency
guarantees. Under the assumptions, we formulate the following Auditing Security :
Definition 4. Given a spatial keyword query function FS, that takes spatial objects
O and a spatial keyword query Q as inputs and outputs a query result RT , the Auditing
Security has the following properties:
B Integrity: (1) Any oi ∈ O digested in the on-chain authenticators cannot be
maliciously modified in query executions. (2) Any Q generated by a vehicular
user cannot be maliciously modified in query executions.
B Correctness: (1) RT is a correct output of FS with inputs O and Q. (2) Vehicular
users accept the correct results.
B Transparency: The targeting keywords of spatial entities and the spatial keyword
query process is transparent and verifiable to the public.
B Accountability: The misbehavior of the ad broker is publicly detected if the ad
broker breaks either the integrity or correctness properties.
55
Remark. (1) The proposed blockchain-based architecture increases public transparency
of the advertising system, which should contribute to the detection of advertising miscon-
ducts. It may also serve as the digital forensic evidence for law enforcement agencies to
take actions against misbehaving parties. Moreover, the advertising smart contract can
also take deposits from spatial entities and the ad broker and transfer the deposited money
to vehicular users in case of any misconducts. (2) TAVLA relies on the pseudonym-based
anonymity in the blockchain networks to protect vehicular users’ query privacy. In spe-
cific, vehicular users interact with the advertising contract using anonymous blockchain
accounts.
4.3.3 Design Goals
TAVLA aims at realizing the following design goals:
B Functionality: TAVLA should support the expressiveness of the spatial keyword
query function in Definitions 1-3.
B Security: TAVLA should achieve the Auditing Security in Definitions 4.
B Efficiency: TAVLA should optimize both the on/off-blockchain computation and
storage overheads for practical implementations.
4.4 Building Blocks
In this section, we present the building blocks of TAVLA, including the spatial indexing
technique, a verifiable computation framework, and the smart contract.
4.4.1 Spatial Indexing
An R-tree [173, 168] is widely used for indexing multi-dimension spatial data. It enables ef-
ficiently location searching that returns spatial objects within a given geographical area. In
specific, an R-tree TR in TAVLA is a balanced tree that contains the following components:
B Bounding Rectangle: It is a non-leaf node in the R-tree and represents a geographical
area. Each bounding rectangle has nb children in the R-tree, that represent smaller
geographical areas within their parent.
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Table 4.2: Notations I
G Multiplicative groups
Ei Spatial entity
O = (o1, o2, ..., on) Collection of n spatial objects
oi = {Li, Ti}
Spatial object oi
Location Li = (xi, yi)
m-dimension topic description Ti
Q = {Lq, Tq, k, λ}
Query location Lq = (xq, yq)
Query topic description Tq
Number of returned spatial objects k
Preference ratio λ
TR Spatial R-tree
MB = (Ll, Lr)
Minimum bounding rectangle MB
Lower-left point Ll
Upper-right point Lr
nl Number of MBs in TR
ne Number of spatial objects in an MB
B Minimum Bounding Rectangle (MB): It is a minimum geographical splitting area,
specified by a lower-left point Ll, and a upper-right point Lr. Each MB consists of
ne spatial entities.
In Fig. 4.3, the upper figure shows an R-tree example, while the lower figure represents
a geographical area. The geographical area is first split into two subareas (bounding
rectangles) (R1, R2), each of which is then split into smaller subareas (R3, R4, R5, R6).
Recursively, the whole geographical area is split into nl = 8 minimum bounding rectangles
(R7 to R14). Each minimum bounding rectangle consists of ne = 50 spatial entities. We
define two algorithms of an R-tree as follows:
Definition 5. Given an R-tree TR, it consists of two algorithms:
B Search. The algorithm takes into a location L and recursively query TR in a
top-down manner to find an MB that contains L. The algorithm returns the
identifier of the found MB.
B Insert. The algorithm takes into a spatial object oi and inserts oi into TR. The
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Figure 4.3: An R-tree Example
in MB, the algorithm inserts oi into MB. Otherwise, the algorithm will Split
MB into two smaller rectangles and Adjust TR to remain balanced.
We omit the details of Split and Adjust algorithms. It is a lively research topic in the
database area [166] and may be of independent research interests in the design of TAVLA.
4.4.2 Verifiable Computation
A VC framework [122] enables a verifier to outsource an execution of an NP-compete
relation to a prover and verify the correctness of the execution results. In particular, an
NP-complete relation R is denoted as a public function F . F takes into I,Q as inputs and
outputs a result R. In a VC framework, F is first converted to a Quadratic Arithmetic
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Program (QAP) [134]. Then, the verification of the function execution is equivalent to
the divisibility check of the QAP. The divisibility check of the QAP is finally converted
to a linear combination check with the Succinct Non-interactive ARGuments (SNARG)
techniques. We present definitions of the Pinocchio VC framework [122] as follows:
Definition 6. A Pinocchio VC framework consists of three algorithms:
V C = {KeyGen, Evaluate, V erify}.
B KeyGen(F , pp). The algorithm takes a function F and system public parameters
pp. It outputs a relation-dependent common reference string CRS = (ek, vk),
where ek is for evaluations and vk is for verifications.
B Evaluate(F , ek, I, Q). The algorithm takes F , ek and function inputs I,Q. It
outputs a function result R along with a correctness proof πF .
B Verify(Q,R, πF , vk). The algorithm takes the input Q, the result R, the proof
πF , and the verification key vk. It outputs true if F(I,Q) → R. Otherwise, it
outputs false.
A VC framework should have the following properties:
B Succinctness: The length of the proof |πF | is polynomial in the system security
parameter α.
B Completeness: An honest verifier will always accept (R, πF ), if F(I,Q)→ R.
B Soundness: An computationally-bounded adversary cannot forge an invalid tuple
(R′, π′F ), where F(I,Q) 9 R and V erify(Q,R′, π′F , vk) = true.
4.4.3 Smart Contract
Smart contract [81, 115] is a computer program executed over the blockchain by all
blockchain peer nodes. A smart contract can take into crypto currencies as deposits from
blockchain nodes, specify terms for the nodes, and take actions (transfer crypto currencies)
if terms are met. In Ethereum, a smart contract is a special blockchain account with codes
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written in Solidity [161] on the blockchain. Participating blockchain nodes execute the
smart contract by function calls as transactions to the smart contract address. In this way,
each contract execution (state transition) is verified by all blockchain peer nodes. Based
on the security and openness of the underlying blockchain, the Ethereum smart contract
has the following properties. (1) Transparency: contract terms and executions are trans-
parent to the public. (2) Security: contract executions are secure, which means the state
transitions must follow the defined terms and cannot be later modified.
4.5 Transparent and Accountable Vehicular Local Ad-
vertising
In this section, we present the blockchain-based TAVLA. First, we summarize the design
strategies of TAVLA. Then, we design a verifiable spatial keyword query scheme with three
phases: System Setup, SKD-tree Construction, and Spatial Keyword Query Processing.
Finally, we develop a TAVLA smart contract that realizes the verifiable spatial keyword
query scheme with on/off chain computation optimizations.
4.5.1 Overview
TAVLA utilizes the public blockchain as an auditing infrastructure, to achieve transparent
and accountable ad dissemination process for the vehicular local advertising. To realize the
promises of the blockchain technology with feasible storage and computation overheads,
we introduce two design strategies as follows:
Digest-and-verify. The ad broker constructs query indexes of the spatial keyword
database, digests the indexes as cryptographic authenticators, and uploads the authen-
ticators onto to the blockchain. The on-chain authenticators have multiple functionalities.
First, the authenticators are the evidence that the indexes are correctly digested. That is,
retailers are able to check that their spatial objects are correctly digested in the indexes.
Second, the ad broker can process spatial keyword queries in an off-chain manner. The
correctness of the query results can be efficiently verified on the blockchain with the help
of the cryptographic authenticators. With this strategy, the on-chain storage and compu-
tation overheads can be reduced to succinct regardless of the size of the spatial keyword
database.
Divide-then-assemble. We identify that off-chain computation and storage overheads
are dominated by the input size of FS, that must be determined at the KeyGen phase
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in the VC framework. If FS takes the whole spatial keyword database as inputs, it would
incur prohibitive off-chain overheads. To enhance the off-chain performance, we adopt the
probabilistic topic model to prune the keyword dimension of spatial objects. Meanwhile,
we divide FS into two verifiable functions: spatial search function FR and topic matching
function FT . FR finds a minimum bounding rectangle MBj that contains an intended
location of a query Q. FT finds top-k spatial objects with highest relevance scores in MBj.
The spatial keyword database is also divided into a spatial index and a topic index with
distinct on-chain authenticators. As a result, FS is realized with modular executions of FR
and FT , the results of which will be assembled on-chain with selective authenticators. With
this strategy, TAVLA achieves a practical off-chain performance by reducing the input size
of the off-chain functions.
4.5.2 Verifiable Spatial Keyword Query
In the following subsections, we present the details of the verifiable spatial keyword query
scheme. We assume secure and authenticated channels are set up for involving entities.
Notations in Definitions 1-6 are re-used.
Table 4.3: Notations II
pp Public Parameters
FS = (FR,FT )
Spatial keyword query FS




I = (IR, IT )
Spatial index IR
Topic index IT = (I1, ..., Inl)
D = (DR, DT )
Spatial index authenticator DR
Topic index authenticator DT
A[j] j-th element of an array A
πR Correctness proof for FR
πT Correctness proof for FT
πD Digest proof for DR
π̂D Digest proof for DT
RT Spatial keyword query result
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System Setup
For illustrative purposes, we introduce a trusted authority (TA) to setup the system. In
practice, the role of TA can be replaced by a secure multi-party computation protocol
[174]. Specifically, a set of entities (e.g. different ad brokers and randomly selected spatial
entities, etc.) can agree on the spatial keyword query algorithm and setup the system. In
practice, such setup mechanism has been successfully running for Zerocash system [96].
TA chooses a system security parameter α and sets the bilinear groups G = (G1,G2,GT , q, e)
with a prime order q and a bilinear paring e. TA chooses g ∈ G1 and g̃ ∈ G2. TA denotes
public parameters of the system as pp = {α,G, g, g̃}. TA divides the spatial keyword query
function FS as (FR,FT ) as follows:
FR(IR, Q)→MBj, FT (Ij, Q)→ RT (4.5)
IR is the spatial index of an R-tree TR. Q is a spatial keyword query Q = (Lq, Tq, k, λ).
FR finds a minimum bounding rectangle MBj ∈ TR that contains Lq and outputs the
identifier j of MBj. Ij is the topic index of spatial objects in MBj. FT finds the top-k
spatial objects in Ij that have highest relevance scores with Q and outputs identifiers of
the k spatial objects as RT . We note that algorithms of FR and FT are determined by TA
at the setup phase, which will be discussed in details in SKD-tree Construction subsection.
TA computes common reference strings for FR and FT . Since Pinocchio VC framework
implements a non-updatable CRS model, TA must determine the size of IR and Ij to
generate the CRS. In specific, TR is denoted as a balanced tree. nb is the number of the
bounding rectangles in each non-leaf node. nl is the number of leaf nodes (MB). ne is the
number of spatial objects in each MB. TA runs KeyGen(FR, pp) and KeyGen(FT , pp)
to generate CRS = (CRSR, CRST ). TA randomly chooses a, b, c ∈ Zq and computes
A = g̃a, B = g̃b, C = g̃c ∈ G32. Then, TA chooses X = {Xi}i∈[1,4nl], Y = {Yi}i∈[1,4nl], where
Xi, Yi are randomly chosen from G1. Similarly, TA chooses X̂ = {X̂i}i∈[1,(m+2)ne], Ŷ =














j , j ∈ [1, (m+ 2)ne], F̂i ∈ CRST .
(4.6)
m is the dimension of the topic description Ti. F = {Fi}i∈[1,4nl] ∈ G
4nl
1 are from CRSR.
F̂ = {F̂i}i∈[1,(m+2)ne] ∈ G
(m+2)ne
1 are from CRST . TA sets Z = {Zi}i∈[1,4nl] ∈ G
4nl




1 . TA denotes KD = (KR, KT , KV ), where KR = (F,X, Y, Z),
KT = (F̂ , X̂, Ŷ , Ẑ), and KV = (A,B,C).
TA publishes {pp, CRS,KD}.
SKD-Tree Construction
Each spatial entity Ei constructs a spatial object oi = (Li, Ti) and sends oi to the ad broker.
Upon receiving oi, the ad broker will return a signature (e.g. ECDCS) on oi as the proof
of receipt. The ad broker collects all received spatial objects as a set O = (o1, o2, ..., on).
Adopting algorithms in Definition 5, the ad broker constructs a spatial index IR and
topic index IT in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1: Index Construction
Input: O = (o1, o2, ..., on)
Output: Spatial index IR, topic index IT
Set TR, IR, IT to ∅
for i ∈ [1, n] do
Insert oi into TR
if (number of MB in TR) < nl then
Pack empty MBs to TR
for MBi ∈ TR do
Add (Ll, Lr) ∈MBi to IR
for oj ∈MBi do
Add (Lj, Tj) ∈ oj to Ii
if (number of objects in Ii) < ne then
Pack empty objects to Ii
Add Ii to IT
Remark. (1) Our design is not coupled to a specific R-tree construction. As a result,
TAVLA can naturally inherit technical advances (such as novel node split/deletion algo-
rithms) for featured spatial databases. (2) Since the size of CRS is fixed in the setup phase,
we pack empty MBs or spatial objects to IR or Ii, to comply with the pre-determined index
size nl and ne. An alternative strategy is that the ad broker first constructs the spatial
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Figure 4.4: An SKD-tree Example
We arrange IR and IT as arrays. IR is a 4nl-dimension array, since each MB has four
coordinates from (Ll, Lr). Ii is an (m+ 2)ne-dimension array, since each oi ∈ Ii has an m-
dimension topic description vector and a 2-dimension location Li. The ad broker computes










j , for j ∈ [1, (m+ 2)ne].
(4.7)
IR[i] represents the i-th element in IR and Ii[j] represents the j-th element in Ij. The
ad broker denotes DT = (DT [1], DT [2], ..., DT [nl]) and uploads the SKD-tree authenticator
D = (DR, DT ) to the TAVLA smart contract. A typical example is shown in Fig. 4.4. We
can see that the SKD-tree is a balanced binary tree with 8 minimum bounding rectangles.
IR consists of MBs from R7 to R14 with an authenticator DR. Each MB contains 50 spatial
objects. For example, R7 contains spatial objects from o1 to o50 with a topic authenticator
DT [7].
Remark We note that the keywords of spatial entities are managed by the ad broker in
an off-chain manner and updated onto the blockchain with a succinct digest, which serve
the following purposes. (1) Spatial entities can require the ad broker to ‘open’ the digest
anytime and check if their spatial objects are correctly included in the authenticators. The
ad broker cannot forge a false opening since he cannot solve the Decision Diffie-Dellman
problem. (2) The ad broker can prove that each ad dissemination is correctly conducted
following the ad dissemination protocol. By doing so, the digest becomes an immutable
and auditable evidence of the advertising system.
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Spatial Keyword Query Processing
Following Definition 3, we present modular designs of the spatial keyword query function,
which consists of three algorithms:
{QExe, QProv ,QV eri}.
QExe (Alg. 2) takes an R-tree TR, a topic index IT , and a query Q = (Lq, Tq, k, λ).
The algorithm outputs top k relevant spatial objects as RT .
Algorithm 2: Query Execution
Input: TR, IT , Q
Output: RT
Run Seach with (TR, Lq), find MBj that contains Lq
for oi ∈MBj do
Compute the relevance score RS(Q, oi)
Add k objects with highest scores into RT
QProv (Alg. 3) takes the public parameters pp, CRS = (CRSR, CRST ), the index
(IR, IT ), MBj, the query Q, the authenticators (DR, DT ), and the digest keys KD. It
outputs proofs π = (πR, πT , πD, π̂D).
Algorithm 3: Query Prove
Input: pp, CRS, (IR, IT ),MBj, Q, (DR, DT ), KD
Output: π
Run Evaluate(FR, CRSR.ek, IR, Q) to generate πR





















Set πD = (Zπ, Yπ), π̂D = (Ẑπ, Ŷπ)
Set π = (πR, πT , πD, π̂D)
QVeri (Alg. 4) verifies the correctness of the proofs.
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Algorithm 4: Query Verify
Input: CRS,Q,D,KV , (j, RT ), π
Output: True or false
Check V erify(Q, j, πR, CRSR.vk)










i , i ∈ [1, (m+ 2)ne] from πT
Check e(Zπ, g̃)
?
= e(DR, A)e(Yπ, B)e(cx, C)
Check e(Ẑπ, g̃)
?
= e(DT [j], A)e(Ŷπ, B)e(ĉx, C)
Return true if all checks pass. Otherwise, return false
Remark. (1) Modular uses of the building blocks is achieved in TAVLA, since the same
building blocks are sufficiently abstracted in the previous section and are used multiple
times. (2) We re-design functions FR and FT to fit the digest-and-verify strategy, which
are implemented in C codes and will be discussed in the performance evaluation section.
4.5.3 TAVLA Smart Contract
We design a TAVLA smart contract that realizes the verifiable spatial keyword query
scheme with Solidity [161] of Ethereum. The contract is created by TA, that stores public
parameters pp, verification keys ekR, ekT , digest verification keys KV , and digest authenti-
cators D = (DR, DT ). The details of TAVLA contract is shown in Alg. 5. The definitions
and algorithms proposed in the previous sections are re-used.
Vehicular users call SendQuery function to send spatial keyword queries to the con-
tract, where addr is the blockchain address of the message sender. The ad broker retrieves
unprocessed queries using the RetrieveQuery function. The ad broker executes the queries
locally via QProv and QExe function, and uploads the results with proofs to the smart
contract via the SendResult function. The correctness of the result and proofs are verified
by the smart contract. The smart contract stores valid results to be retrieved by vehic-
ular users via QueryResult function. For invalid results, the smart contract generates a
verification failure event to notify the public.
Remark. (1) Vehicular user privacy is not a primary concern of TAVLA. Vehicular
users can apply for one-time blockchain accounts and utilize anonymous payment channels
(such as Zerocash). (2) The main goal of the contract is to improve the advertising system
transparency and accountability. The accountability in TAVLA refers to the detection
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Algorithm 5: TAVLA Smart Contract
Require: (ekR, ekT ), KV , (DR, DT )
Set RecQ to (addr,Q, flag)
Set RecR to (addr,MBj, RT )
Function SendQuery(a spatial keyword query Q)
Set addr = sender.addr, flag = 0
Add (addr,Q, flag) to RecQ
Function RetrieveQuery()
Require: msg.sender=ad broker
Retrieve all (addr,Q) from RecQ with flag = 0
Function SendResult(addr, (j, RT ), π)
Require: msg.sender=ad broker
Retrieve (Q, flag) from RecQ by addr
Require: flag = 0
if QVeri(CRS,Q,D,KV , (j, RT ), π) = true then
Set flag to 1
Add (addr, j, RT ) to RecR
else
Generate a verification failure event
Function QueryResult()
Set addr to msg.sender
Retrieve (addr, j, RT ) from RecR
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or public awareness of the ad dissemination misbehavior. Potential obligations on the
misbehavior can be transfers of the ad broker’s pre-deposited crypto currencies or enforcing
fines by law enforcement agencies.
4.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis of TAVLA. We first review the security
properties inherited from the cryptographic building blocks: the blockchain and the ver-
ifiable computation framework. Then, we present the detailed analysis on the security
properties of Auditing Security. Finally, we conclude Auditing Security.
4.6.1 Blockchain Security
The consensus protocol of a public blockchain (i.e. Proof-of-Work in Ethereum) provides
three useful properties: chain growth, chain quality and consistency [81, 175]. Informally,
the three properties guarantee: (1) a valid transaction will be accepted by honest blockchain
nodes within a certain time (transaction confirmation time); (2) a Byzantine adversary that
controls less than 50 percent computation power of the blockchain system cannot control
the growth of the chain; and (3) honest blockchain nodes maintain a consistent view of the
shared ledger.
4.6.2 Verifiable Computation Framework Security
Completeness. An honest verifier always accepts a result and a proof if they are correctly
computed. For Pinocchio VC framework, the QAP -based SNARG system [134] recognizes
an NP-complete relation that can be compiled to an arithmetic circuit C. From the QAP
theorem, the circuit evaluation of C is equivalent to the divisibility check of the compiled
polynomials. The QAP divisibility check is further converted to a linear check over bilinear
groups. Based on the correctness of QAP theorem and bilinear groups, the completeness
is achieved.
Soundness. A computationally-bounded adversary (usually refers to a malicious prover)
cannot forge an invalid result with a proof that passes the correctness check (Verify function
in the VC framework). For a compiled QAP with a degree d and bilinear groups with an
order q, we borrow the theorem from [134] that Soundness is achieved if (1) q-PDH,
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2q-SDH, and d-PKE assumptions hold for q ≥ 4d + 4. (2) The trapdoor secret used to
generate common reference strings is destroyed.
Succinctness. The VC framework achieves a succinct size of proof that depends on the
size of the system security parameter α regardless of the function input size.
4.6.3 TAVLA Security
Based on the above security properties from the building blocks, we give a sketch analysis
of the security properties in Definition 4.
Integrity. Spatial objects are generated by individual spatial entities and sent to the
ad broker in a secure channel. Then, the ad broker computes the authenticators DR and
DT to be uploaded onto the blockchain. To ensure the individual spatial object is digested
in the authenticator, the spatial entity can require the ad broker to compute a proof
for the correct authenticator generation, which is either a zero-knowledge proof of a linear
relation in the discrete logarithm setting or a direct opening of the targeting keywords. The
query smart contract receives spatial keyword queries from vehicular users and verifies the
correctness of query executions using the on-chain authenticators. If the on-chain storage
and advertising contract executions are secure in the Ethereum blockchain, the Integrity
property is achieved in TAVLA.
Correctness. The first property of Correctness comes from three folds: (1) Soundness
of the underlying VC framework. (2) Integrity of spatial objects and spatial keyword
queries. (3) Unforgeability of the on-chain authenticators. For each spatial keyword query,
the ad broker performs the query over the spatial and topic index IR and IT . In specific,
the ad broker runs the Evaluate function of FR and FT and proves the correctness of
query executions. In TAVLA, CRSR and CRST are securely generated by TA or a secure
multiparty computation protocol. The ad broker can forge a query result with a proof
that passes the Verify function of FR and FT , iff the ad broker can break the Soundness
property of the VC framework. The proof πR and πT contain multi-exponentiation forms
cx and ĉx as the representations of IR and IT . In specific, cx and ĉx follow the form of
extended Pedersen commitment for vectors. The ad broker proves that the cx and ĉx open
to the same value of the on-chain authenticators (DR, DT ). The ad broker can forge valid
proofs (π′D, π̂
′
D) that pass the check in Alg. 4, iff the ad broker can solve the SXDH
problem in bilinear groups [141]. For the second property of Correctness, honest vehicular
users will always accept valid results and proofs due to the Completeness property of the
VC framework.
69
Transparency. The Ethereum blockchain is a public and permissionless ledger. Since
the succinct digest of the spatial objects are uploaded to the Ethereum, vehicular users
can require the ad broker to publish the keywords of a specific spatial entity for further
authenticity checking. At the same time, executions of the local advertising contract are
also transparent to the public.
Accountability. We emphasize that Accountability of TAVLA refers to the public detec-
tion or awareness of the ad broker misbehavior. Spatial entities can require the ad broker
to publish the proof of correct authenticator generation, while vehicular users directly
receive the query results on the smart contract, both of which can be publicly verifiable.
4.7 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we implement TAVLA and evaluate its performance with benchmarks in
terms of on/off chain overheads.
4.7.1 Off-chain Overheads
Off-chain operations include System Setup, SKD-tree Construction, and Spatial Keyword
Query Processing. We omit implementations and evaluations of the R-tree and probabilis-
tic topic model, which have been well studied in the non-verifiable setting. In TAVLA,
our implementation goal is to evaluate additional overheads with the implementation of
the VC framework. Thus, we construct testing instances of a balanced R-tree and topic
descriptions. With the testing instances, we evaluate performances of FR and FT , in terms
of off-chain storage and computation overheads.
We conduct off-chain experiments on a Linux system with Intel Core 2.4 GHz processor
and 8 GB memory. The functions FR and FT are written in C codes. We implement the
Python interface of the Pinocchio [122] VC framework that translates the query execution
into arithmetic circuits. We note that the Pinocchio interface is compiled with a 32-bit
version gcc. We write a circuit parser in C++ to parse the obtained circuits with ‘nizk’
circuit inputs (both spatial query Q and spatial objects O) and implement the C++
interface of libsanrk [140, 136, 139] for R1CS languages. Our design is not specified to
particular implementations of QAP -based VC framework. Thus, TAVLA can inherit any
efficiency improvements of future optimizations for QAP -based verifiable computations
[139].
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However, we have found several implementation limitations in the circuit-based VC
framework: (1) The Pinocchio C program compiler only supports static compilation, which
requires fixed-size spatial and topic indexes as inputs [176, 177, 109]. (2) Subscripts of the
array access in the C codes must be determined at the program compiling phase. Thus,
the logarithmic R-tree search algorithm cannot be implemented. Instead, we implement a
linear search algorithm over the leaf nodes in the spatial index. In specific, we must compare
Lq of Q with (Ll, Lr) of each MB. (3) The Pinocchio C program compiler only supports
integers and simple arithmetic operations. We re-write the relevance score function in Eq.
4.4 as follows:
λ1 ×Dist2(Lq, Li) + λ2 ×Dist2(Tq, Ti)
The location coordinates Lq, Li, topic descriptions Tq, Ti and preference factors λ1, λ2 are
set as integers in the experiments. Square root computations of point and topic distances
are eliminated. However, the accuracy of the relevance ranking may be affected compared
with the original metric in Eq. 4.4. Thus, we set a larger k in our experiments. Similarly,
a local search in Google Map for a specific area will return all the relevant results to users.
We first identify the main off-chain performance metrics. In specific, the complexity
of the compiled quadratic arithmetic program is characterized by the QAP variables and
degrees. The storage overhead is characterized by the size of CRS. Another important
metric is the off-chain processing time of the two functions, in terms of CRS setup and
prover computation. We set the number of bounding rectangles nb as 2, which results in a
binary tree structure and is easy to be adjusted to balance when new nodes are inserted.
We set the number of returned objects k to be equal to ne. This is reasonable since a spatial
keyword query usually returns all relevant result to users, such as activity spot search in
Google Map. The dimension m of the topic description vector is 20, which is sufficient
in the probabilistic topic model [167]. The normalization factor η can be adjusted with
the change of λ1. Input sizes of FR and FT , characterized by (ne, nl), greatly affects the
performance. nl is represented as the power of 2, since the R-tree is a balanced binary tree
in the experiments. From Fig. 4.5(a) and 4.5(b), we can see that the QAP complexity is
increasing with nl and ne with different rates.
In Fig. 4.6, the same increasing property with nl and ne is found for PK size. In
Pinocchio vc framework, the V K size is determined by the number of plaintext inputs
and outputs. Since we enable ‘nizk’ for all the input, V K size is solely determined by the
number of outputs, which results in a constant-size V K in FR and a linearly increasing
size of V K in FT . PK size is much more larger (109 magnitude) compared with V K size,
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Figure 4.5: QAP Complexity
since PK must embed information of both input and intermediate gates in the compiled
circuits, while V K only embeds information of output gates.
In Fig. 4.7, the prover overhead refers to the Evaluate algorithm in the VC framework.
The CRS setup is much more costive than the prover overhead, since the setup is an one-
time cost. Meanwhile, the processing time is also increasing as nl and ne grow. It should
be noted that the prover overhead with an input of a few thousand objects is a few seconds
on a laptop, which can be improved at the ad broker with powerful computing clusters.
Moreover, distributed and parallel optimization techniques for verifiable computations can
also be adopted to further enhance the prover performance.
We summarize the storage and computing complexity of cryptographic authenticators
in Table 4.4. Although the complexity increases greatly with the input size (nl, ne), it is
still less significant than the CRS setup and prover computation overheads. The reason
is that multi-exponentiation operation is extremely optimized in the alt-bn128 and bn-128
curves in the libff library [178] of libsnark. For example, a 254-bit multi-exponentiation
operation only takes 231.2 µs on a 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2620 [141]. |G1| refers to the
size of an element in G1. E1 is one exponentiation operation in G1. The digest-and-verify
strategy may slightly increases the size of πR and πT in our off-chain experiments with the
libsnark implementation by requiring independent components cx, ĉx.
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Figure 4.6: CRS Size







































Figure 4.7: Off-chain Computation Cost
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Table 4.4: Digest Cost vs nl, ne
KR, KT Size DR, DT Comp. πD, π̂D Comp.
FR 16nl|G1| 4nlE1 8nlE1
FT 4(m+ 2)ne|G1| (m+ 2)neE1 2(m+ 2)neE1
4.7.2 On-chain Overheads
We implement a Parity Ethereum testing network [151]. The VC framework is instanti-
ated with alt-bn128 curve, which is compatible for the pre-compiled pairing interface in
Ethereum [81]. Since TAVLA smart contract is designed for the Ethereum blockchain,
we take the main performance metrics from the Ethereum to evaluate the TAVLA smart
contract: on-chain storage cost, transaction confirmation time and gas cost of function
calls. The ‘gas’ is a unit in the Ethereum to measure the computation complexity of a
transaction.
Storage cost. The on-chain storage includes the verification keys for FR and FT , the
index authenticators, and the digest verification keys. V K size is determined by the
number of non zero-knowledge variables. The authenticator size for the spatial and topic
index I = (IR, IT ) is (nl + 1)|G1|. The size of the digest verification key KV = (A,B,C) is
3|G2|.
Function call. In Ethereum, each function call is instantiated by an Ethereum transac-
tion. The transaction confirmation time can be approximated by ETH status [179]. The
most expensive function call is the SendResult function, which is dominated by the number
of pairing operations in the function. The verifications of FR and FT include 13× 2 pair-
ings. Compared with our off-chain experiments with the libsnark implementation, TAVLA
needs 1 more pairing for the verification, since the verifier needs to check that the appro-
priate span of cx or ĉx. The authenticator checks require 4 × 2 pairings. According to
statistics in EIP 1108, total verification cost is approximately 1, 201, 000 gas. Note that,
the RetrieveQuery and QueryResult can be conducted without sending transactions to
the smart contract. A node with a full copy of the blockchain storage can locally query
the contract status.
4.7.3 On/off Chain Tradeoffs
The on-chain cost can be reduced to constant with one authenticator for the whole spatial
and topic databases. However, the on-chain strategy will introduce infeasible off-chain cost,
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since off-chain cost is linearly increasing with the input size of FR and FT . We identify
two split factors that can quantify the on/off chain tradeoffs: fr for the spatial database
and ft for the topic database. In TAVLA, fr is set to 1 as FR takes the whole spatial index
as the input. ft is set to nl, as FT takes into a subindex Ij of topic index IR. For very
large spatial databases, the spatial index can be split into different subindexes. The split
factors serve as the tradeoff switches to tune the on/off chain performance: higher ft and
fr increase the on-chain overheads and reduce off-chain overheads.
Discussion. To further increase the real-time processing capability [180] of the adver-
tising system, we present measures for real-world implementations. (1) The ad broker can
adopt a distributed SNARGs to implement Evaluate function over the powerful comput-
ing clusters. (2) The ad broker can tune the on/off-chain tradeoff by dividing the whole
spatial database into sub databases. For example, spatial objects can be organized around
some hot spots. (3) It has been proven that the scalability of a blockchain system can be
significantly improved with novel consensus protocols, such as Proof-of-Stake or Byzantine
Fault Tolerant. We emphasize that our design strategies of TAVLA do not rely on specific
blockchain architectures, and thus can be implemented with efficient consensus protocols.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a blockchain-based transparent and accountable vehicular
local advertising system. With the two design strategies, the proposed system achieves a
notably efficient on/off-chain balance for practical implementations. The experimental
results provide comprehensive benchmarks with splitting factors that can be used to tune
the on/off chain system performance. The practical designs and observed implementation
challenges for the vehicular local advertising system may shed light on general constructions







The technical advances of Internet of Things (IoT) [181] and the next generation wireless
technology (5G) [182] are reshaping the advertising industry. Specifically, a smart advertis-
ing network (SAN ) of connected intelligent objects, such as smart vehicles and smart home
devices, can help retailers to effectively reach users through multiple advertising channels.
For example, a user can receive advertisements of healthy diets from the smart watch, or
promotion codes of nearby shopping centers from the mobile devices. At the same time,
with the explosive volumes of data generated by SAN, retailers are able to profile behaviors
of their users and personalize their advertisements for different users to improve ad rec-
ommendation efficiency. As a result, SAN is surpassing traditional advertising strategies,
such as TV and billboard in 2018, and will be dominating the advertising industry in the
future [183].
In practice, SAN is managed by a third-party broker, such as Google Ads or Facebook
Advertising [33]. With its ubiquitous devices and applications, the broker collects massive
user behavior data to build user preference profile. For example, Google records user
activities from its ecosystem including Android and Google Home devices, and assigns
keyword tags to users based on their activities. Retailers can also choose a set of keywords
as their targeting policies and rely on the broker to disseminate their ads to users of related
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interests. Later, the broker charges the retailers if any user views the ads (per view) or
clicks the links in the ads (per click). By doing so, retailers can enjoy the broker’s wealth
of user data and advertising channels for effective ad disseminations. As a result, SAN has
achieved great commercial success. According to eMarketer [183], Google and Facebook
occupy a quarter of overall ad spending in the US in 2018.
However, there is an emerging challenge for the continuous success of SAN : the lack
of advertising transparency [33, 43, 42]. First, users feel offended by the broker when
they are unknowingly assigned with keyword tags. For example, a simple click on a link
of sports news may give users a tag of ‘football’. Second, users often find themselves
receiving annoying ads that are irrelevant or even biased. For example, ad dissemination
based on gender, age, and nationality is considered as ad discrimination by users [184].
Without proper countermeasures, many users prefer ad-free applications or install ad-
block extensions [55] to filter out advertisements. This leads to the retailers’ decrease in
advertising investments, which greatly hinders the developments of SAN.
To regain users’ confidence on SAN, both the industry and the academic are making
efforts on increasing the advertising transparency. An initial attempt by the broker is to
provide users with personal profile management tools, such as Google’s Ads Setting and
Facebook’s Ads Manager. The brokers also provide users with options of “transparency
explanations” regarding why users are receiving specific ads. For example, Facebook ex-
plains to users the sources and targeting policies of the ads. However, such explanations
are usually insufficient to users [33] and can sometimes be incomplete and misleading [43].
Moreover, prompt actions against the advertising misconduct are insufficient due to profit
consideration and slow internal process of the brokers. At the same time, there have been
many research activities, that utilize trusted hardware [46] and transparency extensions
[42] at user side or introduce an independent organization to enhance transparency of SAN
[45].
Although existing works have explored a wide range of technologies, they mainly rely
on the trustworthiness of a single authority to provide transparency explanations. Due to
profit considerations, the single authority may not always act honestly. For example, it
is reported that major brokers pay the developers of ad-blocking tool to make their ads
on the ‘whitelist’ [47]. Therefore, a solution that builds upon the blockchain architecture
[169] with distributed consensus [185] is more promising for enhancing transparency in
SAN. Specifically, the blockchain is a public ledger with blocks of peer-to-peer transactions
in a fully distributed network. Secured by the cryptography and consensus protocols
[186, 187], the blockchain ensures a consistent and transparent view of the shared ledger
among mutually distrustful nodes. If we view the blockchain as a state machine, every
valid transaction will change the state of the blockchain. As a result, blockchain can be
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utilized as a trusted environment to execute computer programs, i.e., smart contract [81].
Specifically, blockchain nodes can call smart contracts on the blockchain by sending and
verifying transactions.
A straightforward blockchain-based solution is that the broker stores all retailer poli-
cies and user profiles onto the blockchain and designs an advertising smart contract, that
implements the ad dissemination. By doing so, a blockchain-based solution achieves two
distinctive features: (1) Decentralized transparency. The ad dissemination is publicly
verifiable in a distributed network [30]. (2) Automatic accountability. Any advertising
misconduct can be automatically detected and publicly held accountable. However, the
straightforward solution may not be practical in real-world implementations due to the
following challenges. (1) Efficiency. Since on-chain storage and computation resources
are limited, directly implementing the ad dissemination on the blockchain is prohibitively
costive [93, 109] for SAN. (2) Privacy. User profiles contain sensitive personal informa-
tion, e.g., locations and interests [188], which may be exposed to the public due to the
transparency nature of the blockchain.
In this chapter, we propose a blockchain-based Smart Advertising Network with Privacy-
preserving Accountability (SANPA). Specifically, the broker commits to the retailer policies
and ad dissemination algorithms with succinct cryptographic authenticators. The authen-
ticators are updated to an accountability contract on the blockchain to serve as a public
commitment of advertising transparency. Instead of directly implementing SAN on the
blockchain, SANPA enables the broker to manage the ad dissemination in an off-chain
manner. Users and retailers can require transparency explanations about advertising ac-
tivities, e.g., the management of retailer policies and ad dissemination process, by sending
challenges to the accountability contract. With the on-chain cryptographic authenticators,
the accountability contract can publicly verify the correctness of the challenged advertising
activities without sacrificing user profile privacy. At the same time, the accountability con-
tract can hold any advertising misconduct publicly accountable, i.e. confiscating cryptocur-
rency deposits of misbehaving parties. By doing so, SANPA achieves privacy-preserving
accountability for SAN. Specifically, the contributions are summarized as follows:
B We propose a composite SNARG system from Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP)-
based relations and multivariate linear relations in the discrete logarithm setting.
The composite SNARG system is efficient for on-chain verifications of advertising
activities and preserves user profile privacy while pursuing public accountability.
B We design an accountability contract that receives challenges for transparency expla-
nations and enforces accountability on misbehaving parties. The contract implements
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the composite SNARG system and uses the cryptocurrencies as incentives to boosting
honest advertising conducts and promote prompt on-chain responses.
B Through the security analysis, we formulate and achieve privacy-preserving account-
ability in SANPA. Extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate the feasibility
of SANPA. The experimental results present comprehensive benchmarks for both the
off-chain and on-chain computation and storage overheads.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we present the smart advertising
model, security model, and design goals. In Section 5.3, we introduce the building blocks.
In Section 5.4, we propose SANPA, and provide the security analysis in Section 5.5. We
evaluate the performance of SANPA in Section 5.6. We conclude this chapter in Section
5.7.
5.2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we first formulate the smart advertising model in terms of entities and the
ad dissemination strategy. Then, we formalize the security model and the design goals.
5.2.1 Smart Advertising Model
We abstract the existing SAN model in Fig. 5.1, which consists of three entities: Broker,
Retailer, and User.
B User: Users are equipped with multiple devices, e.g., mobile phones or tablets.
They run a wide range of applications and can receive advertisements from multiple
channels, e.g., web search or application push messages.
B Retailer: Retailers are shops or stores that wish to promote their products by
advertisements. Retailers rely on the broker to manage their targeting policies and
pay the broker for the ad dissemination services.
B Broker: Broker is a third-party advertising company (e.g., Google Ads). It manages
user preference profiles and retailer targeting policies, and charges retailers based on




Figure 5.1: Smart Advertising Model
In SANPA, we consider the ad dissemination with the popular keyword matching strat-
egy between user profile and retailer targeting policies [10]. Specifically, a keyword dictio-
nary D = {W1,W2, ...,Wn} consists of n keywords. n is a few hundreds for a subcategory
of the keyword space in Google Ads. The broker can assign each user a set of keywords
from the user’s interaction with the broker’s applications (e.g., Google’s Chrome, YouTube
and Map), and constructs the user preference profile Su. At the same time, the user can
also access and modify her/his preference profile. Each retailer selects a set of keywords
from D and constructs a targeting policy Sr. The broker measures the similarity between
the user profile and retailer policies, and returns the user with advertisements that are
most relevant to her preference profile.
5.2.2 Security Model
Users and retailers are both rational. That is, either users or retailers will only challenge
the advertising system, if there are concerns on the advertising transparency. They will
also accept transparency explanations if the explanations are publicly verifiable. The
broker is a multi-sector enterprise, that may not always follow the pre-determined ad
dissimilation strategy, due to profit considerations, slow internal processes, and the lack
of public auditings. Under the security model, we define the security goal as privacy-
preserving accountability and present its progressive meanings as follows:
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Definition 1. Privacy-preserving Accountability
B Public Verifiability: Users and retailers can require the broker to provide adver-
tising transparency explanations about the ad dissemination process and retailer
policy management, the correctness of which should be publicly verifiable.
B Privacy: User preference profiles are concealed from the public view, even in a
publicly verifiable transparency explanation.
B Accountability: Timely and automatic obligations enforcement on the broker
should be achieved in case of any advertising misconduct.
5.2.3 Design Goals
SANPA should achieve the following design goals:
B Compatibility: SANPA should support the ad dissemination with the keyword match-
ing strategy.
B Security: SANPA should achieve privacy-preserving accountability for the smart ad-
vertising network.
B Efficiency: SANPA should incur applicable overhead to the smart advertising net-
work.
5.3 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the preliminaries in SANPA, including cryptographic commit-
ment schemes, SNARG systems, and digital signature schemes. (1) The cryptographic
commitment is utilized to securely digest targeting policies and user profiles into a suc-
cinct authenticator. (2) SNARG systems can achieve verifiable on-chain transparency
explanations. (3) Digital signature is used to generate non-repudiable off-chain receipts of




R Polynomial-time decidable relation
(x,w) Statement x, witness w
xn n-dimension vector
Xm∗n m ∗ n-dimension matrix
[n] Integers from 1 to n
∈R Choose a random number
Com(x, CK)
Cryptographic commitment Com
Input vector x, commitment key CK
C = (EK, V K) Common reference string C
Evaluation key EK, verification key V K
5.3.1 Notations
G1,G2,GT denote three cyclic multiplicative groups [189] with a prime order p and a
bilinear pairing e : G1 × G2 −→ GT . Zp denotes a ring of integers modules p. r ∈R Zp
indicates r is randomly chosen from Zp. F denotes a finite field. [n] denotes integers from
1 to n. A bold lower letter xn ∈ Fn denotes an n-dimension vector from F. A bold capital
letter Xm∗n ∈ Fm∗n denotes an m∗n matrix from F. From the theory of computation [144],
we denote R as a polynomial-time decidable relation with a statement x and a witness w.
(x,w) ∈ R indicates that R holds on a pair (x,w), which can be efficiently decided by a
non-interactive argument system [143].
5.3.2 Cryptographic Commitment
Cryptographic commitment schemes [125] allow a party to commit to a secret value, such
as an integer or a vector of integers. The commitment can either be directly revealed to
the public, or combined with the zero-knowledge proof technique [190] to demonstrate that
the committed value satisfies a public relation without leaking the value. We define the
cryptographic commitment as follows:
Definition 2. A cryptographic commitment of value x using a commitment key
CK is denoted as Com(x,CK).
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A typical example of commitment schemes in the cyclic multiplicative groups is Peder-
sen commitment. Given an x, r ∈R Z2p, and CK = (g1, g2) ∈ G21, a Pedersen commitment
Com(x,CK) = gx1g
r
2. Given a vector xn, r ∈R Zp, and CK ′ = (g, g1, g2, ..., gn) ∈ Gn+11 , an





5.3.3 Succinct Non-interactive ARGuments (SNARG)
The SNARG system allows a prover to demonstrate that a public relation R holds on a
pair (x,w) to a verifier, which can be defined as follows:
Definition 3. A SNARG system
∑
for an NP-complete relation R consists of
three algorithms:
B KeyGen(R, pp)→ C = (EK, V K)
B Prove(EK, x, w)→ π
B V erify(V K, x, w)→ (0, 1)
KeyGen takes as inputs the relation R and public system parameters pp, and outputs
the common reference string C with EK and V K. Prove takes as inputs the EK, a
statement x, and a witness w. Prove evaluates R on (x,w) and generates a proof π.
V erify takes V K, the statement x, and the proof π. It outputs 1 if (x,w) ∈ R; it outputs
0, otherwise. We define four security notions of SNARG systems as follows:
B Completeness : A rational verifier will accept (x, π) if (x,w) ∈ R and π is correctly
computed.
B Soundness : A computationally-bounded adversary cannot forge an invalid tuple
(x′, w′, π′), such that (x′, w′) /∈ R and V erify(V K, x′, π′)→ 1.
B Succinctness : The proof length is only determined by the system security parameter.
B Privacy Preservation: The verifier only learns whether (x,w) ∈ R.
83
For different relationsR, SNARG systems can be categorized into subsets with different
instantiations and security notions. In SANPA, we consider two categories: (1) Multivari-
ate linear relations in the discrete logarithm (DLog) setting. (2) Quadratic Arithmetic Pro-
gram (QAP) based SNARG in bilinear groups. We do not distinguish the pre-processing
CRS model for the QAP -based SNARG and the classical CRS model for SNARG in the
discrete logarithm setting.
Multivariate Linear Relations in the DLog
The SNARG system for multivariate linear relations can be efficiently recognized by dis-
crete logarithms in multiplicative groups with a prime order [133]. In SANPA, we focus on
two specific SNARG systems in the DLog: (1) the equality test for two Pedersen vector
commitments, and (2) the succinct openness for a subset of a Pedersen vector commitment.
Definition 4. Two extended Pedersen commitments for the same vector xn with















V enables a prover with knowledge x
n to convince a verifier that
Com and Com′ open to the same vector xn.
Definition 5. Consider Rm∗n ∈ Zm∗nP , yn ∈ ZnP is a subset of Rm∗n indexed by








i,j , CK = {gi,j} ∈ Gm∗n1
A SNARG system
∑
S enables a prover with knowledge R to convince a verifier: the
subset of Com(R, CK) indexed by IS opens to y
n.
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We change the position of randomness r in the original Pedersen commitment to a




S achieve completeness, soundness and Succinctness






QAP-based SNARG in Bilinear Groups
Evaluations of R on a pair (x,w) is equivalent to the circuit satisfiability evaluations with
certain inputs. Gennaro et al. [134] proposed a technique to convert the evaluation of an
arithmetic circuit C to the divisibility check of a Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP)
Q. In specific, Q consists of three sets of polynomials V = {vk(x)}, W = {wk(x)}, Y =
{yk(x)}, where k ∈ [0, z] and z denotes the number of input, intermediate and output wires
in C. A target polynomial t(x) is defined by picking a random root for each multiplication
gate in C. An input (a1, a2, ..., ao) ∈ Fo and an output (az−p+1, az−p+2, ..., az) ∈ Fp are valid
assignments of C, iff (ao+1, ao+2, ..., ao+q) ∈ Fq can be found such that t(x) can divide p(x),













(ao+1, ao+2, ..., ao+q) actually denote the assigned values of intermediate multiplication wires.
We define a relation RQ that decides on a pair (x,wz) for an arithmetic circuit C.
wz ∈ Fz corresponds to input, output and intermediate multiplication wires of C. Based
on Equation 1, RQ is represented by a linear combination of wz, which can be efficiently
evaluated in pairing-friendly bilinear groups. Adopting techniques from [122, 138, 141], we




Q is complete, sound and succinct.
5.3.4 Digital Signature
A digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms:
B Gen(G, 1λ)→ (pk, sk)
B Sig(m)sk → πs
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B V eri(m,πs)pk → (0, 1)
KeyGen takes into G and the security parameter λ, and outputs a public/private key
pair (pk, sk). Sig takes into a message m and a secret key sk, and outputs a signature
πs. V eri takes into a message and a signature. It outputs 1 if the verification passes; it
outputs 0, otherwise. We utilize ECDSA signature [79] in SANPA, which is compatible in
the Ethereum.
5.4 Smart Advertising Network with Privacy-preserving
Accountability
In this section, we first give an overview of SANPA including System Model, Design Ideas,
and Workflow. Then, we present the details of SANPA, in terms of Initialization, Off-chain
Smart Advertising and On-chain Transparency Explanation.
5.4.1 Overview
System Model
In SANPA, we introduce two additional entities to SAN : a distributed committee (DC) and
a public blockchain in Fig. 5.2. (1) DC can be a set of independent supervising authorities
running a Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) protocol. For example, Zerocash has
implemented an SMC protocol [174] to setup the blockchain system. (2) Blockchain is
a public ledger, e.g., Ethereum. It is maintained by peer-to-peer blockchain miners and
supports secure and automatic executions of smart contracts. We also assume that secure
and authenticated off-chain channels are established among all entities.
Design Ideas
SANPA introduces an on/off chain computation model for the blockchain-based architec-
ture: (1) User profile and retailer policy managements, and the ad dissemination are con-
ducted in an off-chain manner by the ad broker. SANPA requires each advertising activity
is non-repudiable by the broker, which can be achieved by using digital signatures. (2) Bro-
ker advertising activities are publicly audited with effective accountability enforcements in









Figure 5.2: SANPA Workflow
in the public transparency explanations with the design of a composite SNARG system.
By doing so, SANPA achieves distributed, efficient, and privacy-preserving transparency
explanations.
Workflow
In Fig. 5.2, SANPA consists of the following three phases:









S verifies that retailer policies are correctly managed by
the ad broker.
∑
V verifies that the retailer policies are correctly entered into the ad
dissemination process.
∑
Q verifies that the ad dissemination process follows the pre-
determined keyword matching strategies. DC creates an accountability contract to store
evaluation keys of the SNARG systems. More details are given in Section 5.4.2.
(2) Off-chain smart advertising. Users and retailers register themselves at the broker.
Users manage their preference profiles generated by the broker. Retailers set their targeting
policies. The broker runs the ad dissemination process with the keyword matching strategy
between the user preference profile and retailer targeting policies. The broker finds most
relevant advertisements and sends them to the user.
(3) On-chain transparency explanation. Users and retailers can make challenges to the
accountability contract and require transparency explanations on broker activities, e.g., the
ad dissemination process and the retailer policy management. The broker must response
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to the challenges promptly, by updating correctness proofs of the advertising activities to
the contract. The contract verifies the proofs from the broker and enforces obligations if
any advertising misconduct is identified.
5.4.2 Initialization
DC chooses a system security parameter λ and a set of asymmetric multiplicative groups
G = (G1,G2,GT ) with a prime order p and a bilinear pairing e. g ∈ G1 and g̃ ∈ G2 are
two random generators. DC sets the system public parameter pp = (G, p, e, g, g̃). DC sets
a composite relation as follows:
(Su, SR, So) ∈ RQ
∧(DR = Com(SR, CKR), DR̄ = Com(SR, CKR̄)) ∈ RV
∧(DR, Sr, IS) ∈ RS
(5.2)
DC abstracts the ad dissemination process in Algorithm 6 as a relation RQ on a pair
(Su ∈ ZnP , SR ∈ Zm∗nP , So ∈ ZkP ). Su corresponds to an n-dimension user profile. SR
corresponds to m retailer targeting policies, each of which is also n-dimensional. The
process outputs So, that consists of k retailer identifiers with the most relevant keywords
to the user profile. DR, DR̄ are commitments generated under different commitment keys
CKR, CKR̄. Sr ∈ SR is the keyword set for an individual retailer indexed by IS.






S . The eval-
uation of the relation RQ is achieved by the design of the
∑
Q. To preserve user profile
privacy, the V erify algorithm of
∑
Q takes a commitment Dūo (a commitment of Su and
So) and a commitment DR̄ of retailer policies. However, the original commitment DR̄ in
the
∑
Q does not support efficient verifications of retailer challenges. Therefore, a SANRG
system
∑
S is designed to succinctly reveal the retailer policy from a well-structured ex-
ternal commitment DR. At the same time, SANPA proves that DR̄ and DR open to the







Q as a Pinocchio SNARG system [122], with the following three algo-
rithms:
B KeyGen(RQ, pp)→ CQ = (EKQ, V KQ)
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B Prove(EKQ, (Su, SR, So))→ πQ
B V erify(V KQ, πQ)→ (0, 1)
KeyGen generates CRS CQ with an evaluation key EKQ and a verification key V KQ.
Prove evaluates (Su, SR, So) and outputs a correctness proof πQ. V erify outputs 1 if
(Su, SR, So) ∈ RQ; Otherwise, it outputs 0. We omit the detailed constructions of the
three algorithms, but note that the existence of Pedersen-like commitment keys (CKū ∈




DC chooses a set of random numbers Z ∈R Zm∗nP , and computes CKR = {CKRi,j =
gZi,j}i∈[m],j∈[n] ∈ Gm∗n1 . DC chooses random generators R = {Ri,j}i∈[m],j∈[n] ∈R Gm∗n1






. DC sets T = {Ti,j} ∈ Gm∗n1 . The CRS of
∑
V is as follows:
EKV = (R, T ), V KV = (A,B,C)
∑
S CRS Setup
DC computes C̃KRi,j = g̃
Zi,j ,∀i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] and sets C̃KR = {C̃KRi,j} ∈ Gm∗n2 . DC
computes EKS(i,j)(i′,j′) = g
Zi,jZi′j′ ,∀(i, i′) ∈ [m], (j, j′) ∈ [n], (i, j) 6= (i′, j′). DC sets










V from the DLog, the common reference string consists of sets of non-
identical generators, whose well-formedness can be easily checked by the public. For
∑
Q
from the QAP theorem, a trapdoor secret is used to generate the evaluation and verification
keys, which can be securely computed by DC with a SMC protocol or must be securely
destroyed if the secret is generated by a single authority.
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5.4.3 Off-chain Smart Advertising
The off-chain smart advertising consists of Registration, Retailer Policy Archiving and Ad
Dissemination. We assume secure and authenticated communication channels [191] are
established among users, retailers and the broker.
Registration
The broker registers itself at DC with a public key pkA of ECDSA signature and a
blockchain address addrA. DC validates the identity of the broker and the well-formedness
of pkA.
A user registers herself/himself at the broker with a universal ID IDu and a public
key pku of ECDSA signature. Similar to preference tag management in Google Ads, the
user can obtain a set of keywords provided by the broker from the keyword dictionary
D = {W1,W2, ...,Wn}. The user further sets a preference profile Su as follows:
Su = {Ku,i}i∈[n]
{
Ku,i = 0, if Wi is not selected
Ku,i = ri, ri ∈R ZP , otherwise
(5.3)
The user sends Su to the broker. The broker sets mu = (IDu, Su, Tu), where Tu is a valid
time stamp. The broker computes a signature as SigskA(mu) → πu and sets the evidence
of user preference profile as follows:
Evidu = (mu, πu) (5.4)
The broker sends Evidu to the user and stores (IDu, Su, pku) at its storage. The user
checks Su and V eri(mu, πu)pkA → 1 and sends back an acknowledgement to the broker if
the checks pass.
A retailer registers herself/himself at the broker, with a universal ID IDr, a public
signature key pkr and a targeting policy Sr as follows:
Sr = {Kr,i}i∈[n]
{
Kr,i = 0, if Wi is not selected
Kr,i = ri, ri ∈R ZP , otherwise
(5.5)
For representation simplicity, we assume that there are m retailers in SANPA that are
sequentially indexed. We denote r ∈ [m] as the index number of the retailer IDr, which
means that IDr = r. The broker sets V Kr = {CKRr,j}j∈[n] ∈ Gn1 , where CKRr,j is the
(r, j)-th item in CKR. Similarly, the broker sets Ṽ Kr = {C̃KRr,j}j∈[n] ∈ Gn2 . The broker
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sets mr = (IDr, Sr, V Kr, Ṽ Kr, Tr), where Tr is a time stamp. The broker computes a
signature πr = SigskA(mr) and sets the evidence of the retailer policy Evidr as follows:
Evidr = (mr, πr) (5.6)
The broker sends the Evidr to the retailer and stores (IDr, Sr, pkr) at its local storage.
The retailer checks that V Kr and Ṽ Kr are correctly chosen from CKR and C̃KR, and
V eri(mr, πr)pkA → 1. The retailer sends an acknowledgement to the broker if all checks
pass.
Retailer Policy Archiving
The broker collects targeting policies from m retailers as SR = (S1, S2, ..., Sm). We denote
Ki,j as the j-th item in the keyword set of the i-th retailer Si. The broker computes a









The broker uploads DR to the accountability contract.
Ad Dissemination
The broker generates the non-repudiable evidence of ad disseminations for usres. Specifi-
cally, the ad dissemination in SANPA works with the following steps:
1. The user generates an ad request msid = (sid, IDu, Tsid), where sid is a session id and
Tsid is a time stamp. The user computes πsid = Sig(msid)sku and sends (msid, πsid)
to the broker.
2. The broker checks the time stamp, the user ID IDu and the freshness of sid. If
V eri(msid, πsid)pku → 1, the broker retrieves user preference profile Su and conducts
the ad dissemination in Algorithm 6.

















Algorithm 6: Ad Dissemination with Exact Keyword Matching
Input: User profile Su, retailer policies SR
Output: Retailer Identifier Set So
Set So, Stemp to be empty
for Si ∈ SR do
Set flag to be 1
for Ku,j ∈ Su do
if Ku,j 6= 0 & Ki,j = 0 then
Set flag = 0
if flag = 1 then
Add the retailer identifier IDi to Stemp
Add k identifiers of Stemp to So
m′sid = (Dūo,msid, T
′





sid) to the user.
4. If V eri(m′sid, π
′
sid)pkA → 1 and Dūo is correctly computed with Su, So, CKū, CKō, the




sid). The user also generates an acknowledgement for
the broker to charge the retailer.
5.4.4 On-chain Transparency Explanation
In this section, we first define two types of challenges about the broker advertising activities.
Second, we present an overview of the accountability contract. Third, we present the design
details of the accountability contract.
Advertising Challenge
Two types of transparency challenges are designed in SANPA: (1) Retailer Challenge: A
retailer can make a challenge with Evidr to the accountability contract to check whether
the targeting policy Sr is correctly included in the on-chain authenticator DR. (2) User
Challenge: A user can make a challenge with Evidsid to the accountability contract to
check whether the ad dissemination process is correctly conducted.
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Overview
The accountability contract consists of four phases: Challenge, Prove, Resolve and Claim.
B Initialization. DC initializes system public paraders and creates the accountability
smart contract.
B Challenge. Retailers or users send their evidence to the accountability contract to
require transparency explanations for specific advertising activities.
B Resolve. The broker retrieves the challenges from the accountability contract and
proves the correctness of the activities within a pre-determined threshold time. The
broker uploads the correctness proof of the challenged activities to the contract and
claims the deposits of the challenger if the proof passes the verification.
B Claim. If the broker does not provide the proof within the threshold time, users or
retailers can send a request to the accountability contract and claim deposits of the
broker.
Accountability Contract
We utilize the public Ethereum blockchain to implement the accountability contract. In
SANPA, we require that DC is associated with an Ethereum blockchain address that is
known to the public. In the following, we present the detailed designs of the above four
phases:
Initialization. The broker registers its public key pkA and blockchain address addrA
at DC. DC initializes the SNARG systems for the on-chain transparency explanations. For
the retailer challenge, DC instantiates the SNARG system
∑
S , that is to prove a retailer’s
targeting policy Sr is correctly included in DR. For the user challenge, SANPA designs a




V . DC creates the accountability contract in
Algorithm 7 and 8. The contract stores the broker’s public key and blockchain address, the
public system parameters, evaluation keys of SNARG systems, and the authenticator of
retailer policies DR. The contract also stores a threshold time TH and takes initial deposits
CA from the broker.
Challenge. Users and retailers make challenges of advertising activities to the ac-
countability contract. UserChallenge function takes evidence and deposits Cu from users.
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RetailerChallenge function takes Evidr and deposits Cr from a retailer. Both of the func-
tions will verify the signatures of the evidence, set the time stamp for the challenge, and
record the valid evidence on the contract.
Resolve. The broker retrieves unprocessed user challenges and conducts off-chain





B From RecU , the broker obtains IDu and Evidsid. The broker retrieves Su with IDu
and SR from its storage. Su is the user preference profile and SR is the keyword sets
of all retailers.
B The broker runs Prove(EKQ, (Su, SR, So)) to obtain a proof πQ for RQ. Note that,
there are commitmentsDR̄ = Com(SR, CKR̄), Dūo = Com(Su, CKū)·Com(So, CKō) ∈
πQ.

















i,j , Ki,j ∈ SR (5.9)
B The broker sets πV = (X, Y ).
The broker retrieves unprocessed retailer challenges and conducts Prove algorithm of∑
S. Specifically, the broker obtains IDr, Sr from Evidr and EKS from its storage. We
denote the index IS for Sr as {(r, 1), (r, 2), ..., (r, n)} and Rm∗n as {(1, 1), (1, 2), ..., (m −










The broker uploads (πV , πQ) or πS to the accountability contract by calling UChallen-
geResolve or RChallengeResolve functions. Both functions retrieve unprocessed challenges
from the blockchain storage, and check the correctness and freshness of the proofs. If
the proof is correct, the deposits from users/retailers will be transferred to the broker;
Otherwise, users/retailers will take deposits from the broker.
Claim. Users/retailers can UserClaim or RetailerClaim to claim broker deposits, if
they do not receive a timely response. The functions check the threshold time TH and
the processing status flag, and transfer the broker deposits to users/retailers if a response
delay is identified.
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Algorithm 7: Accountability Contract - Part I
Require: addrA, pkA, pp, V KQ, V KV , DR, TH , CA
Set RecU , RecR to be empty
Function UserChallenge(Evidsid, deposit Cu)
Check V eri(msid, πsid)pkA → 1
Check V eri(m′sid, π
′
sid)pkA → 1
Check IDu||sid * RecU
Set addru = message sender, flag = 0
Set Trecv = block.time
Add the following to RecU :
(IDu||sid, addru, Evidsid, Trecv, f lag)
Function RetailerChallenge(Evidr, deposit Cr)
Check V eri(mr, πr)pkA → 1
Check IDr * RecR
Set addrr = message sender, flag = 0
Set Trecv = block.time
Add (IDr, addrr, Evidr, Trecv, f lag) to RecR
Function UserClaim(IDu, sid)
Retrieve tuples from RecU by IDu||sid
Check addru = message sender, flag = 0
if block.time− Trecv > TH then
Transfer C ′u to addru
Function RetailerClaim(IDr)
Retrieve tuples from RecR by IDr
Check addrr = message sender, flag = 0
if block.time− Trecv > TH then
Transfer C ′r to addrr
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Algorithm 8: Accountability Contract - Part II
Function UChalResolve(IDu, sid, πV , πQ)
Check message sender = addrA
Retrieve Evidsid, f lag, Trecv from RecU
Check flag = 0 and block.time− Trecv < TH
Check (Dūo ∈ Evidsid) = (Dūo ∈ πQ)
Check V erify(V KQ, πQ)→ 1
Check e(X, g̃) = e(DR, A)e(Y,B)e(DR̄, C)
if All checks pass then
Transfer Cu to addrA, set flag = 1
else
Transfer C ′u to addru, set flag = 1
Function RChalResolve(IDr, πS)
Check message sender = addrA
Retrieve Evidr, f lag, Trecv from RecR







j∈[n] C̃KRr,j) = e(πS, g̃)
if All checks pass then
Transfer Cr to addrA, set flag = 1
else
Transfer C ′r to addrr, set flag = 1
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5.5 Security Analysis
First, we summarize the security properties of the SNARG systems in terms of Complete-
ness, Soundness, Succinctness and Privacy Preservation. Then, we discuss the security
and fairness of the accountability contract. Finally, based on the security properties of the
SNARG systems and the smart contract, we give the security analysis of privacy-preserving
accountability.
5.5.1 SNARG Security
The security properties of
∑
Q inherit from the QAP-based SNARG systems [122, 138].
Completeness is recognized by the QAP theorem and the correctness of the linear com-
bination checks in the bilinear groups. Thus, a rational verifier will accept the proof if it
is correctly generated. Soundness ensures the unforgeability of the proof πQ. If q-PDH,d-
PKE,2q-SDH assumptions hold in an Elliptic curve-based groups of order q for a QAP of
degree d where q ≥ 4d+ 4 [138], a computationally-bonded broker without the knowledge
of the trapdoor secret cannot forge a valid tuple (Su, SR, So) /∈ RQ to pass the V erify
function. The proof is succinct (a few group elements) due to the high expressiveness
of EKQ. Users choose random numbers to construct Su in the registration phase, which
makes the corresponding commitments indistinguishable even for two commitments with
the same keyword set. Since only commitments of Su is utilized in the V erify function,∑
Q achieves privacy preservation for the user profiles.∑
V is succinct since there are only 2 group elements in the proof πV .
∑
V is complete
and sound if the SXDH assumption holds in G [141].
∑
S is succinct since there is only
one group element in the proof πS .
∑
S is complete and sound if CDH assumption holds
for computationally-bounded adversaries [133].
∑
S is not privacy preserving as the prover
directly opens the Sr to the verifier. This design is reasonable since
∑
S is used for retailer
challenge, where the targeting policy Sr is required to be transparent to the public.
5.5.2 Smart Contract Security
Smart contract security relies on the underlying Ehtereum blockchain. For a proof-of-work
consensus protocol, the smart contract security is achieved if an adversary cannot control
the most (51 percent) of the computing power in the blockchain network [81]. Informally,
the smart contract in the Ethereum provides three security properties: (1) Immutability.
Data stored in the contract cannot be maliciously modified. (2) Persistence. In a long
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term, honest blockchain nodes will agree on a consistent view of the smart contract states.
(3) Liveness. A correct contract function call will be verified and executed within a certain
period of time, i.e. transaction confirmation time.
5.5.3 Privacy-preserving Accountability
Public Verifiability
The public verifiability [192] in SANPA consists of two parts: retailer policy management
and the ad dissemination process. SANPA designs a trusted setup of the SNARG systems
and the accountability contract, that stores evaluation keys of the SNARG systems and
the cryptographic commitment of the DR to receive challenges from users and retailers.
Due to the immutability of the smart contract, the on-chain storage are secure and cannot
be maliciously modified.
For the retailer challenge, the broker generates the evidence Evidr for each retailer pol-
icy Sr. Evidr is non-repudiable due to the security of ECDSA signature. Any retailer can
require the broker to generate a proof by sending a retailer challenge to the accountability
contract. The broker proves that Sr is correctly included in DR by running Prove function
of
∑
S , which cannot be forged due to the soundness of
∑
S . For the user challenge, the
broker generates the evidence Evidsid for each ad dissemination. The evidence is non-
repudiable due to the security of ECDSA signature. When receiving a user challenge, the
broker proves that the ad dissemination process is correctly conducted with Dūo in Evidsid
and the on-chain authenticator DR. To do so, the broker runs Prove function of
∑
Q and∑




V , the broker cannot forge an invalid proof that
passes V erify functions in the accountability contract.
With the completeness of the SNARG systems, a rational user or retailer will accept
the proof if it is correctly computed. Since the accountability contract is implemented over
the Ethereum blockchian, anyone in the public can verify correctness of the transparency
challenges. In summary, public verifiability is achieved in SANPA.
Privacy Preservation
For the user challenge, users upload the evidence Evidsid to the accountability contract.





V for public verifications of the proof πQ and πV . Due to privacy
preservation property of
∑
Q, the verifications on the contract will not leak the plaintext
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of Su and So, other than if (Su, SR, So) ∈ RQ. That is, privacy preservation for the user
profile is achieved in SANPA.
Obligation Enforcement
SANPA utilizes the smart contract to enforce timely obligations against advertising mis-
conducts. Specifically, the accountability contract takes initial deposits from the broker
and will transfer the deposits if any advertising misconduct is identified. With the liveness
of the smart contract, an advertising challenge cannot be maliciously delayed or ignored.
Moreover, to promote timely responses from the broker, the accountability contract utilizes
the Ethereum block time and sets a threshold TH for each advertising challenge. That is,
obligation enforcement is achieved in SANPA.
5.6 Performance Evaluation
Since SANPA is an add-on component of the existing SAN, we mainly evaluate the addi-
tional overhead of SANPA in terms of SNARG systems and the accountability contract.







S . Second, we analyze the accountability contract in terms of on-chain gas
cost and the off-chain cost for the broker to response to the advertising challenges. All
experiments are conducted on a Linux System with 2.4 GHz processor and 8 GB memory.
5.6.1 SNARG Systems
Since SANPA is an add-on component of the existing SAN, we mainly evaluate the addi-
tional overhead of SANPA in terms of the SNARG systems and the accountability contract.
We utilize a single entity to implement DC in the experiments for illustrative purposes.







S . Second, we analyze the accountability contract in terms of the on-chain gas








S are instantiated based on alt-bn128 curve in the libff library [178]. In Table







B Storage cost of proof and computation cost of V erify remain succinct regardless of
the input size m. This is critical since the verification is conducted on the account-
ability contract with expensive on-chain computation and storage costs.
B Prove and KeyGen consists of multi exponentiations E1 and E2, which is optimized





S are practical for both the on-chain implementations of the V erify
function and off-chain implementations of Prove and Keygen at the broker with powerful
computing resources.
Table 5.2: SNARG Complexity - I
EK VK Proof∑
V 2mn|G1| 3|G2| 2|G1|∑
S (m
2n2 −mn)G1 n(G1 + G2) G1
* |G1|, |G2|, |ZP |, size of a group element in G1,G2,ZP ;
E1, E2, exponentiation operations in G1,G2; P , paring op-
eration in G; m, number of retailers; n, dimension of the
keyword dictionary.
Table 5.3: SNARG Complexity - II
KeyGen Prove Verify∑
V 4mnE1 + 3E2 2mnE1 4P∑
S (m
2n2 −mn)E1 +mnE2 n(mn− n)E1 nE1 + 2P
* |G1|, |G2|, |ZP |, size of a group element in G1,G2,ZP ; E1, E2, exponentiation
operations in G1,G2; P , paring operation in G; m, number of retailers; n, di-
mension of the keyword dictionary.
∑
Q Complexity
We write the ad dissemination process of Algorithm 6 in C. The python interface of Pinoc-
chio is adopted to translate the C codes to circuits. We re-compile the circuit-to-SNARG
interface [140, 193, 139] in libsnark, by instantiating the R1CS ppzkSNARK with alt-bn128
curve, which is supported by pairing operations in the Ethereum [81]. We choose three
tunable system parameters: the dimension of the keyword dictionary n, the number of
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retailers m, the number of returned results k. We also identify three sets of performance
indicators. First, we measure the time costs for the three functions: KeyGen, Prove and
V erify. Second, we measure the QAP complexity by the number of variables and degrees
in the compiled QAP program. Third, we measure the size of PK and V K in bits.
In Fig. 5.3(a), 5.4(a) and 5.5(a), the time cost for Prove and KeyGen increases with
m,n, k. At the same time, the time cost for V erify remains the same: around 0.27s in all
experiments. This is because
∑
Q achieves succinct verification cost with only 12 pairings.
Although Keygen operation is much more expensive compared with Prove and V erify, it
is acceptable since it is an one-time setup and the entity can remain offline after the setup.
Similar properties for the QAP complexity are found in Fig. 5.3(b), 5.4(b) and 5.5(b).
In Fig. 5.3(c), 5.4(c) and 5.5(c), the PK size is much larger than the V K size. Since
the original So instead of its commitment is used in the experiment, the V K size linearly
grows with the number of outputs So. The V K size remains the same in Fig. 5.4(c) as
the number of outputs is fixed at 1000. In Fig. 5.5(c), the V K size is reduced to a few
thousand bits if
∑
Q only outputs a few results.
5.6.2 Accountability Contract
We mainly estimate the gas cost of storing data and conducting cryptographic operations
single algebraic operations and read/store operations are negligible [194] in the contract.
For example, it costs 2,000 gas to store a 256-bit word in the contract storage and 3,000 gas
to verify an ECDSA signature. For alt-bn128 group operations, we take the estimations
of latest optimized precompiled contracts [195].
In Table 5.4, we summarize the storage, computation, and gas cost for the four complex
functions of the accountability contract. For the estimation, we take the theoretical results
of alt-bn128 curve, where |Zp| is 256 bit, |G1| is 512 bit, and |G2| is 1024 bit. We regard





increases the size and verification cost of πQ compared with our libsnark implementations.
Theoretically, two additional elements DR̄, Dūo ∈ G1 are introduced. Two more elements
in G1 for appropriate span checks of DR̄, Dūo are also added. Two more elements in G1 and
two more pairings are also introduced to check DR̄, Dūo are well formed. In Table 5.4, the
retailer challenge is more expensive than the user challenge. As a result, we can increase
the amount of C ′r, such that the broker loses more cryptocurrencies if the misconduct of
retailer policy management is identified.
We summarize some insights into the experimental results. (1) Linear off-chain com-
plexity at the prover is mainly caused by the arithmetic computations. Specifically, dy-
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Figure 5.3: Overhead vs m, n = 100, k = m
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Figure 5.4: Overhead vs n, m = k = 1000
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Figure 5.5: Overhead vs k, m = 1000, n = 100
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namic subscript assignment for arrays and loop breaks are not supported in the implemen-
tation. (2) The efficiency at the on-chain verifier is achieved due to the efficient verifications
of the QAP theorem, which significantly reduces the implementation cost as on-chain stor-
age and computation are expensive.
Table 5.4: Function Complexity & Gas Cost
Function Storage Computation Approximate Gas Cost
UserChallenge 2πE + 4 ∗W32 + |G1| 2ER 20,000
RetailerChallenge πE + 2 ∗W32 + n(|G1|+ |G2|+ |ZP |) ER 14,000 n +9,000
UChalResolve 2 ∗W32 + 13|G1|+ |G2| 18P 719,000
RChalResolve W32 + |G1| 2P + nE1 6,000n +119,000
* |G1|, |G2|, |ZP |, size of a group element in G1,G2,ZP ; E1, exponentiation operation in G1; P , paring operation in G; πE , ECDSA
signature; ER, ECDSA verification operation; Wi, an i-bit word; n, dimension of the keyword dictionary.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a blockchain-based Smart Advertising Network with
Privacy-preserving Accountability (SANPA). SANPA can increase the public awareness of
the advertising transparency with effective enforcements on the advertising misconduct.
We have conducted extensive experiments to demonstrate that SANPA is compatible with
the existing SAN and is feasible for real-world implementations. This research work should
shed light on the future research and practice of a more trustworthy advertising network.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Works
In this chapter, the conclusions of this thesis are drawn and the future works are summa-
rized.
6.1 Conclusions
The thesis addresses the security and privacy threats in the mobile advertising by designing,
implementing, and evaluating a blockchain-based architecture. The thesis takes advantage
of the blockchain technology to enhance the transparency and accountability of the mobile
advertising. At the same time, the thesis presents a set of design strategies to significantly
reduce the on-chain storage and computation overhead while preserving user profile and
review privacy. Specifically, the conclusions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
B Anonymous Reputation System. The thesis first studies the reliable and transparent
review system for the marketplace in the mobile advertising system. To enable mobile
users to leave reviews without the fear of privacy leakage, the research explores an
anonymous review token generation and private review aggregation technique based
on group signature, zero-knowledge proof and homomorphic encryption. The research
also builds a blockchain architecture based on Proof-of-Stake consensus protocol with
a public rating board, where the rating accumulation of each merchant is transparent
and verifiable to the public. Moreover, the research divides the review accumulation
into different phases: token generation, review generation and review aggregation.
Individual review is encrypted and aggregated on the blockchain, and only aggregated
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reviews are revealed to the public. Double-review attacks are prevented while pre-
serving the anonymity and confidentiality of the reviewer. The research also explores
the implementation challenges with a blockchain testing network. The insights and
experiences obtained from the first research pave the way for the following research
works.
B Transparent and Accountable Vehicular Local Advertising. This research investigates
a use case of the mobile advertising, i.e., vehicular local advertising. Specifically,
mobile users traveling in a smart vehicle can receive advertisements based on their
locations and interests. The research explores the characteristics of vehicular local
advertising models as a spatial keyword query function. The research identifies the
lack of transparency issues, where inaccurate or fake advertisements could be sent out
to vehicular users. The research takes into considerations the two dimensions (spatial
and textual) of the vehicular advertising based on the R-tree technique and user in-
terest representation techniques, to design a verifiable spatial keyword query scheme
based on the smart contract. Considering the efficiency issue of the blockchain, the
research proposes two design strategies: digest-and-verify and divide-then-assemble
to reduce the on-chain overheads. The implementation and observations of the vehic-
ular advertising system also provide comprehensive benchmarks for future research
on the mobile advertising system.
B Smart Advertising Network with Privacy-preserving Accountability. The research fur-
ther investigates the privacy issues, especially the user profile privacy, in the mobile
advertising system. The research identifies the public accountability enforcement on
the advertising misbehavior is important to tackle the security threats in the mobile
advertising system. Specifically, the research designs an accountability smart contract
for the smart advertising network. Both users and merchants can enjoy the efficient
ad dissemination services with the design of an on/off-chain advertising model. At
the same time, mobile users and merchants can require transparency explanations
of specific advertising activities by sending challenges to the accountability contract.
With the design of a composite SNARG system for the pre-determined advertising
policy, the accountability contract can verify the correctness of the challenged ad-
vertising activities without exposing user profile privacy. Since the accountability
contract is only executed when transparency explanations are required, the research
achieves a notably effective balance between user privacy and advertising efficiency
at the same time. The research provides comprehensive experimental results for the
off-chain overheads and theoretical analysis of the accountability contract based on
the latest Ethereal status.
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6.2 Future Works
6.2.1 Ad-fraud Attack Mitigation with Public Accountability
A major concern for the continuous success of the mobile advertising model is the ad-fraud
attack [2]. It is highly motivated for the application developers to gain more revenues
with fraud displaying of ad contents. For example, the developers can hide the display
of ads (ad hidden fraud ) or trigger multiple ad impression claims for one single ad clicks
(impression number fraud) [55]. The ad-fraud attacks are reported to cause millions US
dollars every year. Therefore, the ad-fraud attacks reduce the retailer confidence with a
lower ad conversion rate, and more and more mobile users are choosing ad-free applications
or install ad-block software [55]. To build an ecosystem that resolves the ad-fraud issue,
extensive research efforts have been directed to build in-app countermeasures, that monitor
the application runtime environment based on UI-state transition graph [57], machine
learning [32] and trusted hardware [46]. Meanwhile, the ad broker has also proposed
system-level methods that track the abnormal impression traffic or gain reviews from the
mobile users in the app store.
Although the existing countermeasures have great impacts on resolving the ad-fraud
attacks, there still remain some issues that are not fully addressed. First, the lack of system
transparency for the ad broker still exists [169]. The success of anti-fraud methods relies
highly on the trustworthiness of the ad broker. The huge gap between retailers and mobile
users put forward the requirements of increasing the advertising transparency when dealing
with the ad-fraud attacks. Second, the prompt response and actions of the broker over the
fraudulent applications are not well achieved due to benefit and regulation considerations.
According to statistics [40], 21.3/26.9 percent of mobile apps are considered fraudulent in
Apple Store or Google Play. As a result, a framework that increases the advertising system
transparency and engages prompt actions is an urgent task. In the future, further research
will be directed to build a blockchain-based accountability architecture for ad-fraud attack
mitigation [196], where joint accountability will be pursued against misbehaving developers
and ineffective ad brokers.
6.2.2 Blockchain-based Mobile Advertising with GDPR Compli-
ance
In the current mobile advertising system, ad brokers rely on user tracking techniques to
collect user activities and build user profiles for the targeted ad dissemination [10]. Euro-
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pean General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [41] has taken effect since 2018, which
has a great impact on the mobile advertising industry [31]. GDPR grants mobile users with
the a set of rights on their personal data. Mobile users have the “right to be informed”
about how their data are processed at ad brokers and “right to be forgotten” if they would
like to turn off the ad personalization services. More importantly, GDPR enforces strict
controls over sharing of the personal data with third parties, which significantly restricts
the mobile application’s ability to share user data with ad brokers. As a result, it becomes
an urgent need to design an infrastructure that can transparently and efficiently manage
the data flows in the mobile advertising system.
Blockchain with distributed consensus is a promising intermediate for data manage-
ment in the mobile advertising system that enforces GDPR compliance. However, there
are still some issues remaining unsolved. First, it may need a redesign of the fundamental
blockchain infrastructure taking into consideration the roles and motivations of the stake-
holders in the mobile advertising system. Therefore, a hybrid blockchain architecture is
envisioned. The architecture will integrate the features of both public blockchain [81] and
consortium blockchain [89] to define the views of the public and the involved stakeholders
in the advertising system. Second, the fine-grained access control policy for the data shar-
ing over a blockchain architecture requires complex designs of on-chain data storage and
processing model, which not only requires developments of cryptographic primitives, but
also collaborative inter-discipline innovations. In the future, further research efforts will be
directed to design a versatile and efficient blockchain-based data management architecture
for the mobile advertising system.
6.3 Final Remarks
In this thesis, we have designed, implemented, and evaluated a blockchain-based architec-
ture that resolves the security and privacy issues in the mobile advertising system. The
observations in designing the architecture and the experimental results may shed light
on future research on the blockchain-based transparent architecture for the mobile ad-
vertising. Future research directions have been discussed to facilitate collaborations and
implementations from both the academy and the industry.
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[87] R. Böhme, N. Christin, B. Edelman, and T. Moore, “Bitcoin: Economics, technology,
and governance,” Journal of economic Perspectives, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 213–38, 2015.
[88] Bitcoin (BTC) price stats and information. https://bitinfocharts.com/bitcoin/. Ac-
cessed May 2020.
[89] E. Androulaki, A. Barger, V. Bortnikov, C. Cachin, K. Christidis, A. De Caro,
D. Enyeart, C. Ferris, G. Laventman, Y. Manevich et al., “Hyperledger fabric: a dis-
tributed operating system for permissioned blockchains,” in Proc. of EuroSys Con-
ference, 2018, pp. 1–15.
[90] S. Underwood, “Blockchain beyond bitcoin,” 2016.
117
[91] S.-F. Sun, M. H. Au, J. K. Liu, and T. H. Yuen, “Ringct 2.0: a compact accumulator-
based (linkable ring signature) protocol for blockchain cryptocurrency monero,” in
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security. Springer, 2017, pp. 456–
474.
[92] M. Zamani, M. Movahedi, and M. Raykova, “Rapidchain: Scaling blockchain via full
sharding,” in Proc. of ACM CCS, 2018, pp. 931–948.
[93] J. Eberhardt and S. Tai, “Zokrates-scalable privacy-preserving off-chain computa-
tions,” in IEEE International Conference on Blockchain, 2018.
[94] S. Bowe, A. Chiesa, M. Green, I. Miers, P. Mishra, and H. Wu, “Zexe: Enabling
decentralized private computation,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2018.
[95] M. Green and I. Miers, “Bolt: Anonymous payment channels for decentralized cur-
rencies,” in Proc. of ACM CCS, 2017, pp. 473–489.
[96] E. B. Sasson, A. Chiesa, C. Garman, M. Green, I. Miers, E. Tromer, and M. Virza,
“Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from bitcoin,” in Proc. IEEE S&P,
2014, pp. 459–474.
[97] A. Kosba, A. Miller, E. Shi, Z. Wen, and C. Papamanthou, “Hawk: The blockchain
model of cryptography and privacy-preserving smart contracts,” in Proc. of IEEE
S&P, 2016, pp. 839–858.
[98] R. Neisse, G. Steri, and I. Nai-Fovino, “A blockchain-based approach for data ac-
countability and provenance tracking,” in Proc. of ACM International Conference
on Availability, Reliability and Security, 2017, p. 14.
[99] Z. Wu, A. B. Williams, and D. Perouli, “Dependable public ledger for policy compli-
ance, a blockchain based approach,” in Proc of IEEE ICDCS, 2019, pp. 1891–1900.
[100] J. Frankle, S. Park, D. Shaar, S. Goldwasser, and D. Weitzner, “Practical account-
ability of secret processes,” in Proc. of USENIX Security, 2018, pp. 657–674.
[101] M. Li, J. Weng, J.-N. Liu, X. Lin, and C. Obimbo, “Bb-vdf: Enabling accountability
and fine-grained access control for vehicular digital forensics through blockchain,”
Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/011, 2020, https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/011.
[102] A. Boudguiga, N. Bouzerna, L. Granboulan, A. Olivereau, F. Quesnel, A. Roger, and
R. Sirdey, “Towards better availability and accountability for iot updates by means
of a blockchain,” in Proc. of EuroS&PW, 2017, pp. 50–58.
118
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